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•• ABSTRACT 5G mobile communication systems promote the mobile network to not only interconnect
•

people, but also interconnect and control the machine and other devices. 5G-enabled Internet of Things (IoT)
communication environment supports a wide-variety of applications, such as remote surgery, self-driving
car, virtual reality, flying IoT drones, security and surveillance and many more. These applications help
and assist the routine works of the community. In such communication environment, all the devices and
users communicate through the Internet. Therefore, this communication agonizes from different types of
security and privacy issues. It is also vulnerable to different types of possible attacks (for example, replay,
impersonation, password reckoning, physical device stealing, session key computation, privileged-insider,
malware, man-in-the-middle, malicious routing, and so on). It is then very crucial to protect the infrastructure
of 5G-enabled IoT communication environment against these attacks. This necessitates the researchers
working in this domain to propose various types of security protocols under different types of categories, like
key management, user authentication/device authentication, access control/user access control and intrusion
detection. In this survey paper, the details of various system models (i.e., network model and threat model)
required for 5G-enabled IoT communication environment are provided. The details of security requirements
and attacks possible in this communication environment are further added. The different types of security
protocols are also provided. The analysis and comparison of the existing security protocols in 5G-enabled
IoT communication environment are conducted. Some of the future research challenges and directions in the
security of 5G-enabled IoT environment are displayed. The motivation of this work is to bring the details of
different types of security protocols in 5G-enabled IoT under one roof so that the future researchers will be
benefited with the conducted work.

•• INDEX TERMS Fifth generation mobile communication systems (5G), Internet of Things (IoT), security,
•
privacy, key management, authentication, access control, intrusion detection.

I. INTRODUCTION

5G is the fifth generation mobile communication systems
which promotes the mobile network to not only interconnect
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and
approving it for publication was Alessandro Pozzebon.
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people, but also interconnect and control the machine and
other devices (i.e., smart devices). It improves the performance and efficiency which capacitate the user experiences.
5G delivers peak rates up to 10 Gbps, ‘‘ultra-low latency’’
and ‘‘massive capacity’’ which provides the consistence and
uniform service to the user. It is a wireless networking
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FIGURE 1. Evolution/generations of mobile communication system (adapted from [6]).

architecture which was built on the ‘‘802.11ac IEEE wireless
networking standard’’ and aims to improve the data communication speeds by up to three times as compared to its
antecedent ‘‘4G- IEEE 802.11n’’ [1]–[5].
A. EVOLUTION OF MOBILE COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS

The evolution of mobile communication system can be further elaborated as follows [6]:
•

•

•

Earlier Generations (1G, 2G and 3G): 1G (First
Generation) was introduced in the late 1970’s. It did
not have strong security mechanism, suffered from
call drop problems and the data transmission speed
was around 2.4 Kbps. 2G (Second Generation) supported data services like ‘‘short message service (SMS)’’
and ‘‘multimedia messaging service (MMS)’’. The data
transmission speed through General Packet Radio Service (GPRS) was in between 50 Kbps to 1 Mbps.
3G (Third Generation) provided services such as web
browsing, email, video downloading, picture sharing
and other smartphone applications. Its data transmission
stationary speed upto 2 Mbps and mobile speed upto
384 kbps. The theoretical max speed for ‘‘high speed
packet access (HSPA+)’’ is 21.6 Mbps.
4G (Fourth Generation): The motive of 4G is to provide high quality, high capacity and high speed services to the users. It provides better security along
with low cost of data and voice services and Internet over IP. It supports various application such as
‘‘improved mobile web access’’, ‘‘gaming’’, ‘‘highdefinition mobile TV’’, ‘‘IP telephony’’, ‘‘video conferencing’’, ‘‘3D television’’ and other novel computing
environment. It uses key technologies such as ‘‘multiple
input multiple output (MIMO)’’ and ‘‘orthogonal frequency division multiplexing (OFDM)’’. Some essential standards of 4G are ‘‘long term evolution (LTE)’’
and ‘‘worldwide interoperability for microwave access
(WiMAX)’’. Data transfer speed upto 100 Mbps with
moving device or 1 Gbps for low mobility is supported.
5G (Fifth Generation): It was introduced to improve
the limitations and performance of 4G. It support
very good data transfer rate with low latency and
high connection density. It supports device-to-device
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communication with better battery consumption along
with good wireless coverage. The data transfer speed
of 5G is approximately 35 times faster than 4G which
is aimed up to 35.46 Gbps. The technologies work
in the background are ‘‘massive multiple-input and
multiple-output (MIMO)’’ and ‘‘millimeter wave mobile
communications’’. Techniques and technologies like
‘‘small cells’’, ‘‘massive MIMO’’, ‘‘millimetre wave’’
and ‘‘light fidelity (Li-Fi)’’ are utilized to provide
10Gbps with very low latency. It supports connections
approximately for 100 billion devices. Its full fledged
implementation is required up to 2020 to fulfill the raised
requirements of consumers [7]–[9].
The evolution of mobile communication system is also highlighted in Fig. 1 which shows the progress over the last few
decades. It also includes the details of functionality features
supported by various generations.
5G is designed with the forgoing four mega trends (for
example, increased number of devices, traffic growth, high
dependency on cloud and different 5G convergence services).
Some suggestions were given by some interested companies
for selecting the key performance indicators which should be
used in 5G. On the basis of these suggestions, the International Telecommunication Union–Radiocommunication Sector (ITU-R) [10] selected some of the important parameters
that are listed in Table 1.
TABLE 1. Key performance indicators for 5G.

Key performance indicators
Data rate (user experience)
Data rate (peak)
Support for Mobility
Latency
Connection density
Traffic volume density

Target values
100 Mbps to 1 Gbps
10 Gbps to 50 Gbps
Up to 500 Kmph
1 ms
10 6 to 10 7 per Km 2
1TB to 10TB/s/Km 2

B. BENEFITS OF 5G MOBILE COMMUNICATION SYSTEM

5G mobile communication system provides very fast speed
and more reliable connections on smartphones and other
mobile devices (i.e., smart vehicles) than ever before. Some
of the key benefits of 5G networks are [7]–[9]:
4467
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Provides very high data transfer rate (1-20 Gbps) which
facilitates the users to download content very quickly.
Delivers ultra low latency (1 ms) which allows users
to experience less delay when requesting data from the
network.
Capacity increases as the the network expands.
Manageable with the previous generations of mobile
communication technologies.
Effective and supportive for heterogeneous services
(i.e., private network).
Provides uniform, uninterrupted, and consistent connectivity for the various applications (i.e., communication
of smart vehicles) across the world.

IoT is a communication environment of connected physical objects having unique address (i.e., IP address) which
are accessible using the Internet. ‘‘Thing’’ in IoT can be a
patient with smart health monitoring devices or a smart vehicle with built-in-sensors. These objects (i.e., smart devices)
have assigned an IP address and using that they are able
to collect and transfer data over a network without manual
assistance [11]–[15]. Fifth Generation (5G) communication
system has a great impact over the communication happens in IoT. 5G activates innovation across many industries
(i.e., automobile sector, health sector) and provides a platform
to enable the emerging technologies (for example, IoT) to
become an essential part of the economy and people’s daily
lives.
C. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF IoT
COMMUNICATION

Some of the advantages and disadvantages of IoT communication are discussed below [16]–[20].
•

Advantages of IoT
– Easy remote access to information: Using the IoT
communication environment the data from smart
devices which are located far from our location and
in real time can be accessible using the Internet and
smartphone/tablet. This makes it very convenient
for the working class people who can do their job
work and access the smart devices (i.e., in a smart
home) remotely both at the same time [14], [21].
– Provides better communication: A network of
interconnected devices in IoT provides a better
communication environment. It increases the efficiencies by making the communication more transparent. The machine to machine communication
makes the job better, efficient and produces faster
results for instance, communication in industrial
IoT [22].
– Cost-effective: Communication among electronic
devices becomes easy because of the use of IoT.
This helps people to facilitates their day-to-day
tasks. In such environment the transmission of
data packets happen efficiently which also saves
money. Such type of fast transmission of data
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was not possible in the past, that happens because
of the advancement of communication technology
(i.e., evolution of IoT) [16], [19].
– Automation: Automation is biggest requirement
of current time which manages day-to-day activities without any human involvement. In business,
it helps to boost the quality of services and further
scale downs the human involvement.
•

Disadvantages of IoT
– Privacy and security: In current tech driven time
each and every device which an individual uses
is connected to the Internet. This further increases
the risk of leakage of sensitive information. This
is the major drawback of such kind of communication. If information is not handled properly may
lead to the disclosure of confidential information to
the third party. Therefore, some strong authentication, access control, intrusion detection and privacy
preservation protocols for IoT communication to
protect against any kind of data leakage attack are
required [7]–[9], [13], [14], [23]–[26].
– Complexity and compatibility issues: IoT consists of different types of devices and networking protocols which are used to connect them.
A single mistake in that system can affect the entire
performance [27].
– Reduction in number of jobs: The need for human
labor reduced drastically with the task automation as machine replaces the human (labor). This
further impact the employ-ability. With the emergence of IoT applications in future, there will be
decline in the number of jobs available to the
professionals [28]–[30].
– Dependability: There is a drastic change in the
technology and its applications. Technology is
dominating our lifestyle and further increasing
our dependability on technology (i.e., IoT applications). But at the same time it also has some drawbacks for example, if there is some vulnerability in
a system then there are the possibilities that device
does not work properly and can cause other serious
consequences [28]–[30].

D. CONVERGENCE OF 5G AND IoT

It is an estimate that twenty billion IoT devices will be
connected to a worldwide network up to 2020 which will
produce enormous amount of data. Researchers have created
an architecture called the 5G I-IoT paradigm, which is a
merger of 5G cellular network, artificial intelligence (AI)
and IoT that creates an Intelligent IoT (I-IoT) environment.
Such kind of merger of three technologies provide efficient
access to the users for the data generated by IoT devices
which is further useful to make some sense from this generated data. The evolution of 5G networks becomes a major
driving force for the growth of IoT as 5G provides extended
VOLUME 9, 2021
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coverage, faster speeds along with massive bandwidth as
compared to other cellular network communication system.
5G I-IoT paradigm connects IoT devices (i.e., IoT sensors) to
a cloud server, where the sensory data is gathered, processed
and analyzed using AI algorithms. This analysis helps the
users for further decision making. It makes the users capable to take appropriate decisions relevant to their field of
work (i.e., smart transportation, smart agriculture, and smart
healthcare) [13], [23], [27], [36]–[38].
E. APPLICATIONS OF 5G-ENABLED IoT COMMUNICATION
ENVIRONMENT

It can be convinced to everybody that 5G will be the next
revolution. Some of the applications of 5G-enabled IoT communication environment are discussed below.
• Remote surgery: One of the tremendous advantage
of 5G is its low latency feature. Because it has short
time lag between a device pinging the network and
getting the response whereas it was the problem with
4G LTE. Because of such characteristics of 5G network
a surgeon can now perform a remote surgery and his/her
physical presence is not required in the same operation
theater. For example, the doctors at King’s College London has demonstrated the surgery procedure in which
they used a dummy patient by the help of ‘‘virtual
reality headset’’ and ‘‘special glove’’. Through that they
have performed remote surgery by the help of remote
robotic arm [39], [40].
• Self-driving car: A autonomous vehicle (AV) or selfdriving car is a kind of smart vehicle which has ability
to sens its surroundings and safety travelling with negligible human involvement. Self-driving cars are installed
with different types of sensors to get information about
their surroundings. These vehicle are also inbuilt with
some other important functionalities such as inertial
measuring units, odometry, radar and GPS system. The
equipped control systems can interpret the sensed data
to identify the required navigation paths along with the
existing obstacles. AVs are also capable to communicate
among each other for proper decision making and to
select the appropriate path to reach to a destination.
All such communication facilitates through 5G mobile
communication system [41]–[43].
• Virtual reality (VR): Its a kind of artificial environment
which is created using the software and other related
tools. It is presented to the user in such a way that the
user suspends the originality and agrees to accept it like
an actual environment. Mostly it is felt through senses
for example, sound and sight. In a recently held ‘‘mobile
world congress’’, it was demonstrated that ‘‘how 5G
could enhance the user’s experience’’. It permitted the
user to do chatting in the real time with live-streaming
virtual worlds [44]–[46].
• Flying IoT (Drones): Internet of Drones (IoD) is a
‘‘layered network control architecture’’ which is implemented to coordinate the access of unmanned aerial
VOLUME 9, 2021
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vehicles (i.e., drones). It is used to control the airspace
and carries out navigation services between the different
locations. The various services of flying IoT are like
traffic surveillance, search & rescue and package delivery. These drones can communicate to the base station
(server) through the Internet connection. They capture
(monitor) the surroundings and transmit the data to the
base station using the Internet. In order to make such
kind of communication a very efficient mobile communication network is required. Therefore, 5G will be a
suitable match for this [47], [48].
Security and surveillance: Surveillance and analytics
is another application which will be very successful with
5G connectivity. Due to the increasing threats to public
safety in recent years, many governments and security
agencies installing the public surveillance and security
systems. Majority of public video surveillance systems
still rely on wired networks. However adoption for wireless communications such as WiFi or even more the 5G
system is also gaining popularity due to the easy and fast
set-up with low cost. Closed circuit television (CCTV)
systems (for example, cameras installed in vehicles
(i.e., police cars), public transport and surveillance
drones are getting popularity. The adoption of 5G communication system boost up the performance which is
required for sophisticated video content analysis in realtime and the deployment of massive numbers of cameras
in the targeted regions [49]–[51].
Transforming healthcare: Most of the time when
somebody has some illness and he/she needs some
medical treatment and attention travel to a doctor’s
clinic or hospital. But it is very difficult for the people living in the rural area where that kind of medical facilities are not available. Moreover, travelling in
illness is challenging and time-consuming. However,
with the advancement of information and communications technology (ICT), latest tools and technologies
for example, telehealth and remote home monitoring
systems are available through which care can be received
within the comfort of the homes. Remote home health
monitoring system consists of health monitoring devices
(i.e., implantable or wearable health devices) and other
video & imaging facilities in which the communication technologies such as 5G and IoT can be utilized.
These devices sens and transmit the medical information
of a patient (user) to a central authority (i.e., cloud
server) through which a health expert (i.e., a doctor)
can also access the medical data of the patient. Doctors
can suggest medicine (treatment) prescription after a
short video call remotely. Such kind of remote monitoring is equipped with sophisticated imaging equipment
and produces enormous amount of health sensing data
which causes additional strain on the networks. This
often increases the congestion and slows down the data
transfer speeds, especially in a large healthcare system
which may interface with huge number of patients in
4469
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a single day. Therefore, 5G mobile communication system which has very high data transfer speed along with
low latency will be very helpful for such kind of healthcare system [2], [23], [52], [53].

the countermeasures were presented. Some of the research
directions of this domain were also highlighted.
The summary of the existing surveys on security in
5G-enabled IoT environment is also tabulated in Table 2.
G. MOTIVATION OF THIS WORK

F. EXISTING SURVEYS ON SECURITY IN
5G-ENABLED IoT ENVIRONMENT

Here, the details of the existing surveys on ‘‘security protocols in 5G-enabled IoT environment’’ are provided. This
will help the readers how our work is different than the other
existing works.
Granjal et al. (2015) [17] performed an analysis on the
security protocols available to protect the communications in
IoT. They also discussed the existing research proposals and
challenges in IoT security for the future researchers.
Khan et al. [31] (2018) presented the major security issues
in IoT communication. They categorized the famous security
issues as per the IoT architecture. Further they discussed the
security requirements, existing attacks, threats and possible
solutions in IoT communication. Moreover, they explained
how blockchain technology could be utilized to resolve the
IoT security problems. Some of the open research problems
and challenges in IoT security were also highlighted.
Das et al. [32] (2018) presented a survey on security
protocols in IoT. They have provided the details of various
types of attacks possible in IoT communication. A taxonomy of security protocols under different categories such as
‘‘key management’’, ‘‘user authentication’’, ‘‘identity management’’ and ‘‘access control’’ is provided. Few emerging
research directions of the future are also highlighted.
Khan et al. (2019) [1] presented a survey work contained
the details of core technologies which are used to implement
a 5G security model. They discussed the security monitoring
and management of 5G networks. The related security measures and standards of core 5G technologies were also added.
Moreover, some key projects of international significance
in 5G were discussed. Some future research directions were
also highlighted.
Zhou et al. (2019) [33] identified some reasons for threats
and challenges in IoT security. The eight IoT features which
had the most impact on security and privacy of IoT communication were discussed. The current trends of IoT security
along with the reasons and explanations were highlighted.
Noor et al. (2019) [34] presented the analysis of recent
research in IoT security i.e., the trends and open issues. The
details of the current state of IoT security research, the relevant tools, ‘‘IoT modellers’’ and ‘‘IoT simulators’’ were also
provided.
Sengupta et al. (2020) [35] classified the attacks on the
basis of objects of vulnerability. These attacks were also
mapped according to the layers of generalized IoT architecture. Some countermeasures for these attacks were also
provided. The features of blockchain along with its integration into the IoT applications were discussed. A taxonomy
of IoT and Industrial IoT security research areas along with
4470

5G-enabled IoT environment, suffers from different types of
security and privacy related issues as it is vulnerable to various types of attacks such as ‘‘replay’’, ‘‘man-in-the-middle’’,
‘‘impersonation’’, ‘‘password guessing’’, ‘‘physical device
stealing’’, ‘‘illegal session key computation’’, ‘‘privilegedinsider’’, ‘‘malware’’, ‘‘malicious routing’’, many more.
Hence it becomes essential to protect the infrastructure of
5G-enabled IoT environment against the different types of
possible attacks. Therefore, time to time researchers proposed different types of security protocols under different
types of categories like ‘‘key management’’, ‘‘user authentication/device authentication’’, ‘‘access control/user access
control’’ and ‘‘intrusion detection’’. In this reviewed paper
our motivation is to bring all these work under the one roof.
So that the future readers will be much benefited with this
work. Henceforth, the details of different types of security
protocols for 5G-enabled IoT environment are provided.
H. MAIN CONTRIBUTIONS

The contributions of this work are provided below.
•

•
•

•
•

The details of various types of system models i.e., network model and threat model require for 5G-enabled IoT
environment are provided.
Security requirements along with the potential attacks
in 5G-enabled IoT environment are further added.
The various categories of security protocols i.e., ‘‘key
management’’, ‘‘user authentication/device authentication’’, ‘‘access control/user access control’’ and ‘‘intrusion detection’’ in 5G-enabled IoT environment are
discussed.
The analysis and comparisons of the existing security
protocols in 5G-enabled IoT environment are conducted.
Finally, some of the future research challenges and
directions in the security of 5G-enabled IoT environment are highlighted.

I. ORGANIZATION OF THE PAPER

Remaining part of the paper is presented as follows. Various
system models i.e., network model and threat model require
for 5G-enabled IoT environment are presented in Section II.
Section III consists of details of security requirements and
potential attacks in 5G-enabled IoT environment. The numerous categories of security protocols i.e., ‘‘key management’’, ‘‘user authentication/device authentication’’, ‘‘access
control/user access control’’ and ‘‘intrusion detection’’ in
5G-enabled IoT environment are given in Section IV.
Section V consists of the details of analysis and comparisons
of the existing security protocols in 5G-enabled IoT environment. Section VI contains the details of research challenges
VOLUME 9, 2021
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TABLE 2. Existing surveys on security in 5G-enabled IoT environment.

Reference
& Year

Details
of
network
and
threat
models
in
IoT
environment

Security
and
privacy
issues

Security
requirements and
possible
attacks

Categories of
security protocols in IoT
environment

Comparative
study
of
different
types
of
security
protocols
in
IoT
environment

Future
research
directions
of security
protocols
in IoT environment

Key areas covered

Granjal et
[17]
al.
(2015)

X

X

✓

X

X

✓

Khan et al.
[31] (2018)

Only
network
model

✓

✓

X

X

✓

Das et al.
[32] (2018)

Only threat
model

✓

✓

Details

✓

available

Comparisons
of IDS not
available

Analysis on the security protocols
in IoT, existing research proposals
and challenges in IoT security for
the future researchers
Categories of security issues, discussed security requirements, existing attacks, threats and possible solutions in IoT, use of blockchain in
resolving the IoT security problems,
open research challenges in IoT security
Provided the details of various types
of attacks possible in IoT communication. A taxonomy of security protocols under different categories is
provided along with few emerging
research directions
Core technologies for 5G security
model, network softwarization security, 5G privacy concerns, security measures and standards of 5G
technologies, key projects, future research directions
Identified reasons for threats and
challenges in IoT security, eight IoT
features which had the most impact
on security and privacy of IoT communication, current trends of IoT
security along with the reasons and
explanations
Analyzed the current research in
the field of IoT security, details of
relevant security tools, different IoT
simulators and modellers
Provided
countermeasures
for
the classified attacks, features
of blockchain along with its
integration into the IoT applications,
a taxonomy of IoT/IloT security
research areas along with the
countermeasures, some research
directions
details of network model & threat
model, security requirements and attacks possible, categories of security
protocols, analysis and comparisons
of the existing security protocols,
future research challenges and directions

IDS

of
not

Khan et al.
[l] (2019)

Only
network
model

✓

✓

X

X

X

Zhou et al.
[33] (2019)

X

✓

✓

X

X

X

Noor et al.
[34] (2019)

X

X

Only
attacks

X

X

X

Sengupta
et al. [35]
(2020)

X

✓

✓

X

X

X

Proposed
work

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

for the future in the security of 5G-enabled IoT environment and some directions to resolve them. The details of
lessons that has been learnt from this work are available in
Section VII. Section VIII contains some concluding remarks
of this work.
II. SYSTEM MODELS

In an 5G-enabled IoT environment following models can be
utilized.
VOLUME 9, 2021

A. NETWORK MODEL

The network model of the 5G-enabled IoT environment is
given in Fig. 2. In this figure there are different types of
scenarios i.e., smart farming, smart home, smart manufacturing, smart transportation system, smart healthcare and
smart grid. These scenarios consists of various types of smart
IoT devices such as smart vehicles, smart healthcare device
(for example, connected inhalers), smart home appliances
(for example, smart AC controller), smart meters, smart soil
4471
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5G-enabled Internet of Things
communications environment
Smart
manufacturing
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~~9
~
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~
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Users .
accessmg data
remotely

transportation
system

~ Gateway

~~mart

home

node

FIGURE 2. Network model of 5G-enabled IoT environment (adapted from [11]).

moisture sensor and smart industrial devices. These devices
sense, monitor and control some the required functions. The
smart devices send the data to some central units such as cloud
servers or fog servers through specific devices (i.e., gateway
nodes). In the given figure, there are also various types of
users (i.e., IoT mobile app user) and they wish to access the
data of the IoT devices remotely. Users can access the data of
IoT devices via gateway nodes using the Internet connection.
In such kind of communication environment, data generation
and communication happen at the massive scale. Therefore,
some strong communication infrastructure for such kind of
communication environment which provides very efficient
communication with very low latency is needed. Hence 5G
communication infrastructure is much suitable for this environment [1]–[3], [11], [22], [23], [37], [54]–[56]. This communication environment also suffers from some ‘‘security
and privacy’’ issues as it is prone to various types of attacks.
The details of associated threats of such kind of communication environment are provided in Section II-B.
B. THREAT MODEL

The widely-accepted ‘‘Dolev-Yao (DY) threat model’’ [57]
can be accepted in the designing of ‘‘security protocols’’
in 5G-enabled IoT environment. As information provided in
Section IV, the security protocols are the collection of different types of protocols such as ‘‘key management’’, ‘‘user
authentication/device authentication’’, ‘‘access control/user
access control’’ and ‘‘intrusion detection’’. According to the
guidelines of the DY model, two communicating entities
4472

disseminate through a open (insecure) communication
medium. The terminus nodes functioning as cloud/fog
servers, IoT devices are not in general trustworthy. The
existing network adversary (A) has the ability to eavesdrop,
delete or update the exchanged messages as the channel is
open (insecure). Another model, ‘‘Canetti and Krawczyk’s
adversary model’’ in short ‘‘CK-adversary model’’ [58],
also the current de facto standard model for the designing
and modeling of an ‘‘authenticated key agreement’’ security
mechanism. In this model, A can have same capabilities
like the DY model. Moreover, A can also accommodate the
secret credentials along with the ‘‘session states & session
keys’’ utilized in a session. Furthermore, A has the ability
to physical capture some of the smart IoT devices to deduce
the stored information from the devices by the application
of steps of ‘‘power analysis attack’’ [59]. The obtained data
can be used to launch other types of severe attacks like computation of ‘‘identities’’, ‘‘passwords’’ and ‘‘session key’’.
This helps A to launch other attacks in the network for
example, ‘‘device impersonation attack’’, ‘‘replay attack’’,
‘‘man-in-the-middle attack’’ and ‘‘privileged-insider attack’’.
Apart form that A can reproduce new malicious devices with
other attack launching functions (i.e., wormhole, blackhole)
by the help of extracted information. After fabricating these
malicious devices (i.e., blackhole attacker nodes) A directly
deploys them in the target area [60]–[62]. Under the effect
of discussed attacks the data packets (messages) can be lost,
dropped, delayed or updated. Again it affects the performance
of the communication in an 5G-enabled IoT environment.
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This causes diminution in ‘‘throughput’’ and ‘‘packet delivery
ratio’’ and accretion in ‘‘end-to-end delay’’.
III. SECURITY REQUIREMENTS AND POTENTIAL ATTACKS
IN 5G-ENABLED IoT COMMUNICATION

•

Here, various ‘‘security and privacy’’ issues of 5G-enabled
IoT communication are discussed. Apart from that the security requirements and the possible attacks are discussed.
•

A. SECURITY AND PRIVACY ISSUES IN 5G-ENABLED
IoT COMMUNICATIONS

Although IoT is rapidly growing and researchers discovered
the new techniques to fix the issues in IoT communication.
But it still faces security and privacy issues [63]–[67].
• Lack of robust security schemes: IoT devices are
connected with the system i.e., desktop or smartphone.
In such an environment the lack of security mechanism improves the threat of leakage of personal data.
The collected and transmitted data of IoT devices may
be disclosed (i.e., health data collected through smart
healthcare devices).
• Openness of the network: It is necessary to connect IoT
devices with a consumer network which have connection
with the other the systems. It is also possible that IoT
devices comprehend with some security vulnerabilities,
which may be harmful for the network of the consumers.
Because it may become the entry point for the attacker
to get entry into the system.
• Privacy of sensitive data: IoT environment consists of
different types of devices, which have various types of
hardware and software. Some of them may be vulnerable
to different attacks i.e., replay, MITM, impersonation,
password guessing, etc. Therefore, the sensitive data
may be leaked through unauthorized access and manipulations. Some of these devices transmit user’s personal
information such as name, address, contact number, date
of birth, health data and credit card. Hence it is always
required to protect the communication of IoT against the
possible attacks.
B. SECURITY REQUIREMENTS IN 5G-ENABLED
IoT ENVIRONMENT

The essential security requirements in 5G-enabled IoT environment along with the ‘‘general security requirements’’ are
provided here [68]:
• Authentication procedure: This procedure is used to
validate the identities of the communicating devices
(i.e., IoT device). Mutual verification of identities is
mandatory to start a secure communication and it should
be conducted in advance. In a 5G-enabled IoT environment, authentication may be happened among the
smart IoT devices, various kind of servers (i.e., cloud,
fog, edge servers), various kind of users, the service
providers and gateway nodes.
• Integrity property: It provides assurance of real and
accurate data. The composition of the received message
VOLUME 9, 2021
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should not accommodate illegal inject, unapproved
modification and removal. Data should be safeguarded
against unauthorized modification.
Confidentiality property: This property provides protection of information against any kind of unauthorized
access. In another way, it is known as ‘‘privacy’’ which
protects the exchanged messages against any kind of
disclosure attacks.
Non-repudiation property: It assures any entity should
not deny the validity of something for example, a message. It is one of important service in ‘‘information security’’ which provides proof regarding the ‘‘origin of the
message’’ and ‘‘integrity of the data’’ in that message.
Therefore, it is very difficult for the illegal entities to
deny the ‘‘origin of the message’’ and ‘‘authenticity of
the message’’. Digital signatures methods are useful for
‘‘non-repudiation’’. For example, in case of a online
transactions, where it is important to assure that a party
to whom the contract was made (communicated party)
should not deny the originality of his/her signature on
the report. It has following categories:
– Source’s non-repudiation: It provides assurance of
genuineness of the sender. This concludes the message was transmitted by the genuine source.
– Destination’s non-repudiation: It provides assurance of genuineness of the receiver. This concludes the message was received by the genuine
receiver.
Authorization procedure: Authorization procedure is
used to regulate device or user privileges (i.e., access
restrictions) for network or system resources (i.e., files,
data applications and services). Generally, it is anticipated by authentication procedure for the verification of
identities of device or user. In general a authority (for
example, a administrator) designs and implements the
access rules for all available resources.
Freshness property: This property provides assurance
of ‘‘data freshness’’. Hence the illegal entity will
not be able to re-transmit the previously exchanged
messages.
Availability property: It provides assurance that the
information is only available to the genuine entities.
If an adversary is not able to produce the attack on the
confidentiality and the integrity then he/she may contend
for other hazardous attacks such as distributed denialof-service (DDoS) attack on a web server which brings
down the associated websites.
Forward secrecy property: If an entity (for example,
smart home user, smart IoT device) leaves the communication network then it must not have any ability to access
the future messages.
Backward secrecy property: If an entity (for example, smart home user, smart IoT device) is just
deployed in the communication network then this entity
should not be able to access the previously exchanged
messages.
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C. POSSIBLE ATTACKS IN 5G-ENABLED
IoT COMMUNICATION

An 5G-enabled IoT communication can have following
potential attacks which may be performed by a passive or an
active adversary [69]:
• Eavesdropping: It is also called as sniffing or snooping
attack. It happens in case when attacker eavesdrops the
exchanged messages among the communicating parties.
It is one of the potential attacks in 5G-enabled IoT
communication as this will help the attacker to launch
further attacks.
• Traffic analysis: It is a another form of passive attack in
which attacker does the interception and an examination
of the exchanged messages to figure out what’s going on
there.
• Replay attack: It happens when a attacker intercepts the
exchanged messages and then deceitfully delays or re
transmits it to confound the receiving entity.
• Man-in-the-middle attack (MITM): In this malign activity, first attacker expropriates the transmitted messages
and then attempts to update or delete the messages
before forwarding them to the receiver.
• Impersonation attack: In this malign activity, a attacker
successfully determines the identity of a genuine communicating party and then creates a message and sends
that to the recipient on the behalf of the ‘‘genuine communicating party’’.
• Denial-of-Service attack: In this malign activity,
an adversary conducts some vengeful tasks to prevent
the legitimate parties from accessing the resources
of the network or system (for instance, some data
resource or some IoT device). There is also a variant
DoS of attack, called as the ‘‘Distributed DoS (DDoS)’’
attack which is conducted through the multiple attacker
systems simultaneously. Some of the examples are
UDP, HTTP, TCP SYN flooding attacks. The flooded
packets under these attacks consume the resources (for
example, bandwidth) of the targeted system (i.e., web
servers) very quickly [70]–[72]. In an 5G-enabled IoT
communication the DoS attack can also preformed
through other types of routing attacks for instance,
sinkhole, wormhole, greyhole, blackhole and misdirection attacks. In such attacks the physically deployed
attacker nodes disturb the ongoing routing process to
drop, delay or modify the exchanged packets. In presence of such attacks data messages (packets) may be
altered, delayed or dropped before reaching to their
intended recipient. This causes increment in the ‘‘endto-end delay’’, diminution in the ‘‘throughput’’ and
also affects the other network performance parameters
[60]–[62], [73].
• Database attack: In an 5G-enabled IoT communication,
database related attacks are also feasible on the database
managed through different servers i.e., fog server,
cloud server. The examples are ‘‘Structured Query
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Language (SQL) attack’’, ‘‘Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
attack’’ and ‘‘Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)’’. The
existing adversary launches these attacks to harm the
financial assets for example, he/she may perform illegal
money transfer from a authorised user’s account or may
change the password of a genuine user’s account.
Malware attack: Sometimes an adversary executes
malicious script in a remote system to perform various unauthorized activities for example, stealing, deletion, updating and encryption of important information.
Malware may be of different types, for example, virus,
worms, keylogger, spyware, ransomware and Trojan
horses. They are also used to monitor the activities of
the users without his/her consent. For the spreading of
malware in IoT environment adversary can use botnet
(associated and collaborated attacker systems). The botnets like Mirai, Reaper, Echobot and Necurs are active
these days. These attacks may also harm the functioning
of 5G-enabled IoT environment. A smart IoT device can
be hijacked (controlled) remotely by making the use of
malware. Sometimes it is vary risky for the people (for
example, smart pacemaker probably initiates inessential
electrical pulses for a patient and under such circumstances patient may die) [74]–[85].
Insider attack: In this malign activity, ‘‘a privilegedinsider user’’ of the trusted authority exploits the
stored information to introduce other severe attacks
such as session key computation, password guessing
attack.
Physical capturing of deployed devices: The physical monitoring of IoT devices is not possible for
24 × 7 hours. Therefore, sometimes adversary gets
chance to capture these device physically and then
tries to extract the sensitive information (i.e., identities,
secret keys, etc.) from the memories of these devices.
Further adversary may utilize this information to conduct other unwanted activities (for example, impersonation, password guessing, session key computation and
man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks) in an 5G-enabled
IoT environment [59].

IV. CATEGORIES OF SECURITY PROTOCOLS IN
5G-ENABLED IoT COMMUNICATIONS ENVIRONMENT

As discussed earlier 5G-enabled IoT communications environment suffers from various attacks. Therefore, researcher
working in this domain proposed various security protocols which can be divided into different categories for
example, ‘‘key management protocols’’, ‘‘authentication/user
authentication protocols’’, ‘‘access control/user access
control protocols’’ and ‘‘intrusion detection protocols’’
[1], [17], [31]–[35]. In this section, some of existing security protocols of this domain under the discussed categories
are briefed. The pictorial view of classification of security
protocols in 5G-enabled IoT communications environment is
also provided in Fig. 3.
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Security protocols in SG-enabled Internet of Things
communications environment
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which administer security on the basis of the available factors.
The three factors used in authentication methods are like
user’s credentials (i.e., information of used username and
password), user’s used device (i.e., smart card or smartphone)
and user’s biometrics information (i.e., his/her iris scan or fingerprints) [14], [22], [40], [48], [55], [104]–[109].
C. ACCESS CONTROL/USER ACCESS CONTROL

1. Key management
protocols

3. Access control/user access
control protocols

2. User authentication/device
authentication protocols

4. Intrusion detection protocols

FIGURE 3. Classification of security protocols in 5G-enabled IoT
communications environment.

A. KEY MANAGEMENT

A key management protocol does the generation, distribution, establishment and management of cryptographic keys
among the communicating parties in an IoT environment. The
defined procedure contains various steps such as ‘‘generation
of key’’, ‘‘exchange of key’’, ‘‘usage of key’’ and ‘‘revocation
of key’’ according to the demand. Key management protocol
utilizes a ‘‘cryptographic procedure’’ that keeps the details
of key servers (the trusted authority), various types of users
(i.e., static or mobile) and devices involved (for example,
smart IoT device). To provide secure communication strong
key management practice should be followed [56], [86]–[89].
Ordinarily, a key management protocol contains some phases
like ‘‘pre-deployment phase’’, ‘‘key generation and distribution phase’’, ‘‘key establishment phase’’ and ‘‘key revocation
& dynamic device addition phase’’ [56], [90]–[104]. The
details of different phases of key management protocols are
provided in Fig. 4.
B. USER AUTHENTICATION/DEVICE AUTHENTICATION

User/device authentication is a procedure of identification
and verification of the identities of the communicating entities i.e., user or device. Generally, the communicating entities
user, smart IoT devices verify their identities among each
other which is also known as mutual authentication. After the
successful completion of ‘‘mutual authentication’’, the disseminating entities establish a session key to secure their
communication. Device authentication also happens in the
same way. In order to simplify this, the details of user authentication process are given. A user authentication scheme for
an 5G-enabled IoT communications contains phases such as
‘‘system setup and pre-deployment phases’’, ‘‘user registration phase’’, ‘‘login phase’’, ‘‘authentication & key agreement phase’’, ‘‘password & biometric update phase’’ and
‘‘dynamic device addition phase’’. The details of these phases
are provided in Fig. 5. The ‘‘two factor’’ and ‘‘three factor’’
user authentication mechanisms are very common in practice
VOLUME 9, 2021

The access control methods put restriction on the access
of the user or device to the resources of a network or system. The followed mechanism grants access and privileges to
different users or devices for the various available resources.
To enhance the overall lifetime of the IoT communication
environment, it is required to add new devices i.e., smart IoT
device in the network. That may occur in case if a device stop
its working due to battery depletion or some physical stealing [59]. There are also the chances that an adversary tries to
install his or her malicious device in the target area [60], [61].
For this reason, it is essential to differentiate among malicious
devices and legitimate devices. Accordingly, secure access
control methods to restrict the entry of pernicious entities
in 5G-enabled IoT environment should be designed. Access
control protocols has two categories ‘‘certificate-based access
control’’ and ‘‘Certificate-less access control’’. These protocols contain phases such as ‘‘device authentication phase’’
and ‘‘key establishment phase’’ [24], [54], [110], [111]. The
details of different categories and phases of access control
protocols are provided in Fig. 6. However, It is important
to notice that to provide the access to the genuine users for
certain resources and services user access control protocols
are utilized.
D. INTRUSION DETECTION

Intrusion detection protocols are deployed for the monitoring
and analysis of pernicious exertions inside a system or a
network. A system which does this work of ‘‘intrusion
detection’’ is named as ‘‘intrusion detection system (IDS)’’.
An IDS defends various devices i.e., smart IoT device against
the potential attacks. The used intrusion detection technique
in an 5G-enabled IoT environment monitors and verifies the
different types of traffic (may be normal or malicious), and
then predicts the sign of intrusions. If an intrusion is detected
then the linked tool takes the required action for example,
blocks the IP of malicious source or sends the information
of intrusion to the administrator. Apart from that there also
some possibilities that an adversary may physically steal few
IoT devices. Then adversary may try to deduce the secret
information (i.e., credentials, secret keys) from the stolen
device through the steps of ‘‘power analysis attacks’’ [59].
Further, the adversary tries to set up his/her pernicious nodes
(devices) by storing the deduced information in these nodes.
These ‘‘malicious devices’’ are capable to launch some hazardous attacks i.e., routing attacks (for example, sinkhole,
blackhole, misdirection, wormhole, etc.) [60]–[62], [73].
Under the effect of these potential attacks, the exchanged
information may be leaked, modified, delayed or dropped
4475
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Phases of a key
management protocol

4. Key revocation and dynamic
device addition

1. Pre-deployment phase
Various paramete1·s for different
network entities are defined by
trnsted authority. The registration
of communicating parties i.e.,
Io T devices, users ancl other devices

Tn1sted authority generates a new
Cl'edentials and store them in the
memory of new devices and then deploy
them in the target field

2. Key generation and distribution
Different cryptogrnphic keys (i.e., secret
key) for network entities are generated
and distributed by tmsted authority
using the symmeh·ic key c.ryptography
and public key cryptography methods

3. Key establishment
Afte1· the completion of 1·egistrntion and
deployment of diffe1·ent network entities.
They entities proceed for key establishment
process by the help of exchanged messages

FIGURE 4. Phases of key management protocols.

~

Phases of a user/device
authentication protocol

1. System setup and pre-deployment

4. Authentication and key agreement

The trusted authority chooses different
system parameters and also registers the
details of the entities and then entities
will be deployed in the target area

The communicating

2. User registration
To conduct the registration, user first selects
his/her credentials and then sends them to
tl'llsted authority through some secure
channel. After the successful completion of
all steps, a smart card or a mobile de"ice l>ill
be provided to registered user in a sec.m·eway

entities authentication

among each other mutually and establish
a session key for the secure communication
through certain nu1nber of exchanged
1nessages

5. Password and biometric update
A genuine UCjerprovides his/ her old passw01·d and
biometric infol'mation to the terminal of a s1na1·t
phone. Then the genuine user c-hooCiesa new
passwor·d of his/her choice and new biometric
information. If pasc;word and biometric updates
conducted surressfull~•, then old inf01·mation will be
replaced with the new information

3. Login phase
6. Dynamic device addition
A genuine user prnvides his/her credentials to the
terminal of the smarlphone. After that device checks
the genuineness of the user. If verification happens
successfully, then the login request message will be
sent to the next communicating entity

Trusted authori~- computes new Cl'edentials for the
new device and stores them in its memory. Then the
device will be installed to the deployment area

FIGURE 5. Phases of user authentication/device authentication protocols.

before forwarding them to the required destination. That
causes serious deterioration in the performance of the network i.e., improvement in ‘‘end-to-end delay’’, decrement in
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‘‘network throughput’’ and ‘‘packet delivery ratio’’ [61], [73].
Moreover, IoT botnets may also attack such kind of communication through which the bots make efforts to install
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Phases of an access control protocol
Access control protocols can be divided into
two categories:
Certificate-based access control: In this scheme

a digital
certificate i.e., X.509 cel'tificate can be stol'ed in each deployed
devic.e. Aftel' that the pl'e-Ioaded cel'tific.1te can be utilized to
pl'ove a de"ice's identity to its neighbol's

rs~1--~~:/
r,:
'~-'~I

~

l

~

"

Certificate-less access control:

In such schemes hash-chain
based pl'ocess is utilized for the access contl'ol pl'ocedure

Phases

1. Device authentication

phase

A newly deployed device i.e., smart loT devire must
authenticate itself to the other neighbor device.
It assures that it is an ol'iginal device which is
granted to :,cress the information from the devices
located in the neighborhood

2. Key establishment phase
A newly deployed device should be adept to
maintain shared secl'et keys with its neighbol'
devices to secure the fuhtl'e communication.
This cau be performed propel'ly, if the
authentication happens successfully among
the neighbor devices

FIGURE 6. Phases of access control protocols.

malware in the operating system or in the memory of IoT
devices. Under the existence of malware attacks, the IoT
devices may work inaccurately or stop completely. Hence
it is crucial to provide protection to the 5G-enabled IoT
environment against the intrusions. Therefore, it is mandatory to study intrusion detection protocols for such an environment [12], [13], [74], [112]–[117]. IDS can be divided
into two classes on the basis of the deployment: i) ‘‘network based intrusion detection system (NIDS)’’ which recognizes interventions inside a network (for example, Suricata)
and ii) ‘‘host based intrusion detection system (HIDS)’’
which recognizes interventions inside a system (for example,
OSSEC). Furthermore, ‘‘intrusion detection techniques’’ can
be categorised as: i) ‘‘misuse based detection’’, ii) ‘‘anomaly
based detection’’ and iii) ‘‘specification based detection’’
[118], [119]. Their features are available in Fig. 7.
V. EXISTING SECURITY PROTOCOLS IN 5G-ENABLED
IoT COMMUNICATIONS ENVIRONMENT

As discussed in Section IV, the security protocols in
5G-enabled IoT communications environment can be divided
into four categories. Here the details of some of the existing
protocols belong to these categories are provided.
A. EXISTING KEY MANAGEMENT PROTOCOLS IN
IoT ENVIRONMENT

The details of authentication and key management schemes
is provided in the following part of this section. Li et al. [120]
VOLUME 9, 2021

presented a identity-based hierarchical model for cloud computing. It has associated encryption and signature techniques
which were used in the designing of identity-based authentication schemes for cloud computing services. It was proved
that the presented method was efficient than ‘‘secure socket
layer (SSL) authentication protocol’’. Li et al. [121] used the
‘‘elliptic curve cryptography (ECC)’’ for the designing of an
authentication protocol suitable for cloud computing environment. Hu et al. [122] proposed methods for identity authentication, data encryption and data integrity checking. The
methods were proposed to achieve confidentiality, integrity
and availability properties. Mishra et al. [123] also proposed
a authentication and key management scheme for secure
multimedia communications in IoT-enabled WSNs. Later on
it was observed that some of the existing schemes lacking in security and functionality features as various attacks
such as ‘‘smart card stolen’’, ‘‘impersonation’’, ‘‘password
guessing’’, ‘‘replay’’ and ‘‘man-in-the middle’’ attacks were
possible [109]. Sharif et al. [124] proposed ‘‘a lightweight
authentication and key agreement scheme’’ for IoT based
WSNs. The formal security verification by employing the
automated formal security verification software toll named
as ‘‘Automated Validation of Internet Security Protocols and
Applications (AVISPA)’’ [125] is also provided for [124].
Wazid et al. [56] proposed a ‘‘key management and authentication’’ technique for the secure communication in fog
computing environment. The key management procedure
was utilized for the ‘‘smart devices and fog servers’’ &
4477
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Types of intrusion
detection techniques

1. Misuse based detection

3. Specification based detection

It is also called the rule based or signature based
detection. Siguatul'e is associated with au anomaly
(i.e., virus) and will be generated when such au
anomaly comes inside the system. The generated
siguatnl'es of the existing known attacks al'e used to
prevent such attar.ks in the future. It. has low false
positive rate in case of detection of known anomalies

The specifications and coustl'aiuts for the
description and conectuess of the detection
process are defined. Then the behaviol' of the
network or system as per the specifications and
coustrniuts is mouitornd and analyzed. It is also
able to detect the unknown attacks. It performs
detection with low false positive rate.

2. Anomaly based detection
It works on the basis of statistical behavior analysis.
It tries to identity on the basis of deviation from the
normal uetwol'k traffic flow. If it identities any
divergence from the normal behavio1; it will raise au
alarm. It is effective for the detection of unknown attacks

FIGURE 7. Types of intrusion detection techniques.

‘‘fog servers and cloud servers’’, ‘‘pairwise key establishment’’ for the secure communication.

TABLE 3. Comparison of computation cost- key management protocols.
Protocol

1) COMPARATIVE STUDY OF EXISTING KEY MANAGEMENT
PROTOCOLS IN IoT ENVIRONMENT

The comparative study of existing key management protocols in IoT environment is provided in Table 5. The protocols of Li et al. [120], Li et al. [121], Hu et al. [122],
Mishra et al. [123], Sharif et al. [124] and Wazid et al. [56]
were compared and analyzed. The protocols of Li et al. [120],
Li et al. [121], Hu et al. [122] did not support most of
the required security and functionality features whereas the
protocols of Mishra et al. [123], Sharif et al. [124] did not
provide the support for multi-server environment. Moreover,
the formal security analysis using the widely accepted RealOr-Random (ROR) model [126] were not provided for most
of the protocols. The protocol of Wazid et al. [56] supported
most of the security and functionality features and they have
also provided different types of security analysis for their
protocol.
The comparison of computation cost of different protocols is given in Table 3. Suppose Tecm , Teca , Tsed , Th ,
Tfe , Tα , Tβ , Tρ , Tχ , Texp , Tpke and Tpkd represent the
computational time required for ‘‘an elliptic curve point
multiplication’’, ‘‘an elliptic curve point addition’’, ‘‘a symmetric encryption/decryption operation’’, ‘‘a cryptographic
one-way hash function h(·) operation’’, ‘‘a fuzzy extraction
operation (fuzzy extractor probabilistic generation function
4478

Li et

al.
[120]
Cost

Time
(ms)

lTa+
lT,s+
lTµ+
lTx
243

Mishra
et
al.
[123]

Li et al.
[121]

Hu eta/.
[122]

Wazid et
al. [56]

Sharif
et al.
[124]

23Th

l3Th +
5Tecm
+4Tsed

4Texp+
3(Tpke
+Tpkd)

35Th +
5Tecm
+lTJe

33Th

11.5

356.68

7308

395.95

16.5

Gen(·) or fuzzy extractor deterministic reproduction function Rep(·) [127])’’, ‘‘identity-based encryption (IBE)’’,
‘‘identity-based decryption’’, ‘‘identity-based signature generation’’, ‘‘identity-based signature verification’’, ‘‘modular
exponentiation operation’’, ‘‘public key encryption operation’’ and ‘‘public key decryption operation’’, respectively.
The time taken for the computation of bitwise XOR operation
can be considered negligible. Hence it is not considered in
the performance evaluation. The evaluation results for various
cryptographic operations are provided in [128]–[130]. The
various experiment values as provided in [128]–[130] for
Tecm , Teca , Tsed and Th are 0.063075 s, 0.010875 s, 0.0087 s
and 0.0005 s, respectively. Like [130], it is assumed that the
execution time requires for a fuzzy extractor is approximately
equal to an elliptic curve point multiplication time at most,
which is Tfe ≈ Tecm = 0.063075 s. Furthermore, as depicted
in [128], Texp ≈ 60 Tsed = 0.522 s, and Tpke /Tpkd ≈
100 Tsed = 0.87 s can be considered. Therefore the
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computational time for the schemes of Li et al. [120],
Mishra et al. [123], Li et al. [121], Hu et al. [122],
Wazid et al. [56] and Sharif et al. [124] are 243 ms, 11.5 ms,
356.68 ms, 7308 ms, 395.95 ms and 16.5 ms, respectively.
The schemes of Mishra et al. [123] and Sharif et al. [124] are
efficient from the computation cost point of view.
TABLE 4. Comparison of communication cost- key management
protocols.

Protocol

Li et
al.
[120]

Mishra
et al.
[123]

Li et
al.
[121]

Hu
et al.
[122]

Wazid
et al.
[56]

Sharif
et al.
[124]

No.
of
messages
Cost
(bits)

2

4

4

3

3

6

14280

2528

4160

7168

2816

2720

TABLE 5. Comparison of functionality and security features of key
management protocols in IoT environment.

Protocol
/Feature

Li et
al.
[120]
2009

Li et
al.
[121]
2015

Hu
et al.
[122]
2017

Mishra
et al.
[123]
2017

Sharif
et al.
[124]
2019

Wazid
et al.
[56]
2018
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Note: ¢¢1: device anonyrmty property; ¢¢2: pnv1leged-ms1der
attack; cpcp3:
replay attack; cpcp4:
man-in-the middle attack; c/Jc/Js:
session key agreement; cpcp5:
support for multi-server environment;
¢¢1: provide formal security verification using Automated Validation of Internet Security Protocols and Applications (AVISPA)tool;
¢¢ 8: Session key security; ¢¢ 9: formal security analysis using
Real-Or-Random (ROR) random oracle model
F: insecure against a particular attack or does not support a specific
feature; T: secure against a particular attack or supports a specific
feature.

The comparison of communication cost of various protocols is available in Table 4. The different sizes are assumed
as ‘‘identity is 160 bits’’, ‘‘prime p in Ep (a, b) is 160 bits’’
by contemplating the security of ‘‘160-bit elliptic curve cryptography (ECC)’’ commensurate to ‘‘1024-bit RSA’’ [131],
‘‘random nonce is 128 bits’’, ‘‘timestamp is 32 bits’’, ‘‘hash
digest is 160 bits’’ (in case of ‘‘Secure Hash Algorithm
(SHA-1) hash function’’ [132]), and ‘‘block size of a plaintext or ciphertext in symmetric encryption or decryption’’
(in case of ‘‘Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [133]’’)
is 128 bits. Public key cryptography is followed in Hu et al.’s
scheme [122] utilizes ‘‘1024-bit RSA algorithm’’. Therefore
the communication costs for the protocols of Li et al. [120],
Mishra et al. [123], Li et al. [121], Hu et al. [122],
Wazid et al. [56] and Sharif et al. [124] are 14280 bits,
2528 bits, 4160 bits, 7168 bits, 2816 bits and 2720 bits, conjointly. The protocols of Mishra et al. [123], Wazid et al. [56]
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and Sharif et al. [124] are efficient from the communication
cost point of view.
B. EXISTING USER AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOLS
IN IoT ENVIRONMENT

The details of user authentication protocols in IoT environment is given as follows. Porambage et al. [134] proposed a ‘‘certificate-based authentication scheme’’ in WSNs
for distributed IoT applications. The developed scheme had
‘‘two-phase authentication protocol’’ which allowed the sensor nodes and the end-users to authenticate each other and
to maintain a secure connection. Porambage et al. [135]
presented two group key establishment protocols for secure
IoT communication. The deployment conditions and requirements of the protocols were also described in terms of IoT
application scenarios. The proposed protocols were also analyzed and justified in terms of performance analysis, scalability and security. Turkanovic et al. [136] proposed ‘‘a
user authentication and key agreement scheme’’ for heterogeneous WSNs applicable to IoT. The presented scheme helped
the remote user to establish a secure session key with a sensor
node by the help of a lightweight key agreement mechanism.
The presented method also ensured the ‘‘mutual authentication’’ among the user, sensor node and the gateway node.
Their presented scheme could be adapted for the resourceconstrained WSN as it only utilized ‘‘simple hash’’ and
‘‘XOR computations’’. Farash et al. [137] proposed a protocol for ‘‘user authentication and key agreement’’ for heterogeneous WSN applicable for IoT environment. Challa et al. [11]
presented a user authentication protocol for IoT applications.
The presented scheme was based on ‘‘elliptic curve cryptography (ECC)’’ and depended on ‘‘ECC-based digital signature’’. The presented scheme supported user anonymity and
untraceability properties. However, this scheme needed more
computation and communication costs. Wazid et al. [138]
proposed ‘‘a lightweight authentication protocol’’ in cloudbased IoT environment (LAM-CIoT). Through LAM-CIoT,
an authenticated user could access the data of a remote
IoT sensors securely. LAM-CIoT utilized efficient ‘‘one-way
cryptographic hash functions’’ along with ‘‘bitwise XOR
operations’’. LAM-CIoT was also analyzed for security part
by the help of formal security analysis using the widelyused ‘‘Real-Or-Random (ROR)’’ model, formal security verification through ‘‘Automated Validation of Internet Security
Protocols and Applications (AVISPA)’’ tool as well as the
informal security analysis. It proved the resilience of the
presented protocol against possible attacks.
1) COMPARATIVE STUDY OF EXISTING USER
AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOLS IN IoT ENVIRONMENT

The comparisons of functionality and security features of
user authentication protocols in IoT environment is provided in Table 8. The schemes of Porambage et al. [134],
Porambage et al. [135], Turkanovic et al. [136] and
Farash et al. [137] did not support most of the security and functionality features. However, the scheme of
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Challa et al. [11] and Wazid et al. [138] provided most
of security and functionality features. But the scheme of
Challa et al. [11] produced little more computational and
communication overhead. Hence from the security, functionality features and computation & communication costs point
of views the scheme of Wazid et al. [138] seems much better.
The computation and communication costs for the schemes
of Porambage et al. [134], Porambage et al. [135],
Turkanovic et al. [136], Farash et al. [137], Challa et al. [11]
and Wazid et al. [138] are computed and analysed. The
similar assumptions are taken as the information available in Section V-A1. The computation cost for the
schemes of Porambage et al. [134], Porambage et al. [135],
Turkanovic et al. [136], Farash et al. [137], Challa et al. [11]
and Wazid et al. [138] are 6Th + 4Tecm +2Teca , 18Th +
15Tecm +4Teca , 19Th , 11Th , 12Th + 14Tecm +1Tfe and
34Th + 1Tfe , respectively. Furthermore, time taken for the
schemes of Porambage et al. [134], Porambage et al. [135],
Turkanovic et al. [136], Farash et al. [137], Challa et al. [11]
and Wazid et al. [138] are 79.2, 279.9, 6.08, 3.52, 260.34,
27.98 ms, respectively. Therefore, the user authentication
protocols of Turkanovic et al. [136], Farash et al. [137] and
Wazid et al. [138] performed better from computation cost
point of view. The results are also reported in Table 6.
TABLE 6. Comparison of computation cost- user authentication protocols.

Protocol

Cost

Time
(ms)

Porarnbage
et
al.
[134]

Porarnbage
et
al.
[135]

Turkanovic
et
al.
[136]

Farash
et al.
[137]

Challa
et al.
[11]

Wazid
et al.
[138]

6Th
+
4Tecm
+2Teca
79.2

18Th +
15Tecm
+4Teca
279.9

19Th

llTh

34Th+
lTJe

6.08

3.52

12Th+
14Tec
+lT e
260.34

27.98

The communication cost for the schemes of
Porambage et al. [134], Porambage et al. [135],
Turkanovic et al. [136], Farash et al. [137], Challa et al. [11]
and Wazid et al. [138] are also computed and analysed.
The similar assumptions are taken as the information available in Section V-A1. The communication cost for the
schemes of Porambage et al. [134], Porambage et al. [135],
Turkanovic et al. [136], Farash et al. [137], Challa et al. [11]
and Wazid et al. [138] are 1536, 3360, 2720, 2752, 2528
and 1696 bits, respectively. Therefore, the user authentication
protocols of Porambage et al. [134] and Wazid et al. [138]
performed better from communication cost point of view. The
results are also reported in Table 7.
C. EXISTING ACCESS CONTROL PROTOCOLS
IN IoT ENVIRONMENT

The facts of access control protocols in IoT environment are presented in the following part of this section.
Li et al. [139] proposed an access control technique for wireless sensor networks applicable to IoT environment. They
have utilized a heterogeneous signcryption scheme which
allowed the party to send a message to another party in
4480

TABLE 7. Comparison of communication cost- user authentication
protocols.

Protocol

Porarnbage
et
al.
[134]

Porarnbage
et
al.
[135]

Turkanovic
et
al.
[136]

Farash
et al.
[137]

Challa
et al.
[11]

Wazid
et al.
[138]

No. of
messages
Cost
(bits)

4

4

4

4

3

3

1536

3360

2720

2752

2528

1696

TABLE 8. Comparison of functionality and security features of user
authentication protocols in IoT environment.

Protocol
/Feature

Farash
et al.
[137]
(2016)

Challa
et al.
[11]
(2017)

Wazid
et al.
[138]
(2019)

Porarnbage
et
al.
[134]
(2014)

Porarnbage
et
al.
[135]
(2015)

Turkanovic
et
al.
[136]
(2014)

¢¢1
¢¢2
¢¢3
¢¢4
¢¢5
¢¢6
¢¢7
¢¢s
¢¢9
¢¢10
¢¢11
¢¢12
¢¢13
¢¢14
¢¢15
¢¢16
¢¢17
¢¢1s

F
F
F
F

T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T

T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T

F
F

F

T

T

NA
NA

NA
NA

F
F
F

F
F
F
F

T
T

T

F

T
T
T
T

T
F

T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T

NA
T
F
F

T
T
T
F
F
F

NA

T
T
T

F

F

F

T
T

T
T
T

F
F
F

NA

NA

F
F
F

T

F

T

F

Note: <fx/)1:user anonymity achievement; </></>2:
privileged-insider
off-line password guessing attack; q>q>4:
stolen smart
attack; q>q>3:
denial-of-service attack; </></>6:
card or mobile device attack; q>q>5:
user impersonation attack; </></>1:
replay attack; </></>s:
man-in-the
mutual authentication achievement ; </></>10:
middle attack; q>q>g:
provide session key agreement; </></>11:
support untraceability propresilience against sensor node or sensing device physierty; </></>12:
server independent password update procal capture attack; </></>13:
sensor node or sensing device impersonation attack;
cedure; </></>14:
</></>15:
support biometric update procedure; q>q>15:
formal security
smart card revocation
verification through AVISPA tool; </><f>n:
known session-specific temporary information
process ; </></>1s:
attack.
F: insecure against a particular attack or does not support a specific
feature; T: secure against a particular attack or supports a specific
feature; NA: not applicable.

an identity-based cryptography environment. Their protocol
is costly in terms of computation cost due to utilization
of identity-based cryptography (IBC) and bilinear pairing
mechanisms. Braeken et al. [140] proposed an efficient and
distributed authentication protocol (eDAAAS) for the accessing of end nodes in an IoT environment of smart home.
Their protocol was based on symmetric key cryptographic
technique and one-way cryptographic hash function. Though
this protocol had low computation cost but it had high communication cost. Furthermore, this protocol involved gateway
node in the access control mechanism between the two IoT
devices. Luo et al. [141] presented a access control protocol for WSNs applicable to IoT environment. It facilitated
the communication of Internet user in an certificate less
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cryptography environment with the smart device in an IBC
environment. However, their protocol was costly in terms
of computation cost because of the utilization of IBC and
bilinear pairing mechanisms. Ding et al. [142] presented a
attribute-based access control mechanism for IoT environment. The blockchain technology was utilized to record the
distribution of attributes to avoid the single point failure and
for data security. Riad et al. [143] proposed access control
protocol for managing and securing the cloud-hosted electronic health records. Their protocol ensured the secrecy of
patient’s data in which only authorized users were able to
edit or review the health data of patients. Fan et al. [144]
presented a privacy preserving multi-authority access control protocol for fog-based IoT environment. In their protocol verifiable outsourced decryption was used to reduce
the computation costs for the end user devices. A secure
user revocation method was also designed. The discussed
protocols [139]–[141], [143], [144] are vulnerable to the
session key leakage and other attacks [145]. Das et al. [145]
presented a certificate-based lightweight access control and
key agreement protocol for IoT environment. It utilized
mechanisms such as elliptic curve cryptography (ECC)
and collision-resistant one-way cryptographic hash function.
Various analysis i.e., formal security analysis under ‘‘RealOr-Random (ROR) model’’, informal (non-mathematical)
security analysis and formal security verification through
‘‘Automated Validation of Internet Security Protocols and
Applications (AVISPA)’’ tool were provided. The conducted
analysis proved the resilience of their protocol against possible attacks.
1) COMPARATIVE STUDY OF EXISTING ACCESS CONTROL
PROTOCOLS IN IoT ENVIRONMENT

The comparison of functionality and security features of
access control protocols in IoT environment is provided
in Table 11. The protocols of Luo et al. [141], Li et al. [139],
Braeken et al. [140] and Das et al. [145] (2019) were
compared and analysed. The protocols of Luo et al. [141],
Li et al. [139], Braeken et al. [140] did not provide the
required security and functionality features whereas the protocol of Das et al. [145] provided the most of the desired security and functionality features along with less computation
and communications costs. The protocol of Das et al. [145]
will be preferable for the access control mechanism in IoT
environment.
The comparison of computation costs are provided
in Table 9. The protocols of Luo et al. [141], Li et al. [139],
Braeken et al. [140] and Das et al. [145] are compared and
analyzed. The similar assumptions are taken as the information available in Section V-A1. However, Tbp and Tme
are time needed for bilinear paring operation and modular
exponentiation operation. As reported in [145], time required
for Tbp ≈ 32.71 ms and for Tme ≈ 2.25 ms. The computation costs of protocols of Luo et al. [141], Li et al. [139],
Braeken et al. [140] and Das et al. [145] are 3Tecm + 4Tbp +
4Th + Teca + Tme , 3Tecm + 5Tbp + 2Th + 2Teca , 23Th + 2 Tsed
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TABLE 9. Comparison of computation cost-access control protocols.

Protocol

Luo et al.
[141]

Cost

3Tecm
4Tbp
4Th
Teca

Trne
173.62

Time
(ms)

+
+
+
+

Li et al.
[139]

3Tecm
5Tbp+
2Th
2Teca

+

Das et al.
[145]

Braeken
et
al.
[140]

23Th
2Tsed

+

7Tecrn
6Th
3Teca

+

204.05

1.40

+
+

94.41

TABLE 10. Comparison of communication cost- access control protocols.

Protocol

Luo et al.
[141]

Li et al.
[139]

Braeken
et
al.
[140]

Das et al.
[145]

of
No.
messages
Cost (bits)

2

2

3

3

3040

3488

3552

3296

TABLE 11. Comparison of functionality and security features of access
control protocols in IoT environment.

Protocol
/Feature

Luo
et al.
[141]
(2018)

Li

et
al.
[139]
(2016)

Braeken
et al.
[140]
(2016)

Das
et al.
[145]
(2019)

¢¢1
¢¢2

T
T

T
T

T
T

<p<P3
<p<p4
<p<p5

F

F

F

<p<p7

T
T
T
T

T
T
T
T

T
T
T
T

</J</Js

T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T

¢¢6

F

F

F

<p<pg

T

T

T

¢¢10
¢¢11

F
F

F
F

F
F

¢¢1: replay attack; ¢¢2: man-in-the-middle attack; ¢¢3: mutual authentication achievement; ¢¢4: key agreement achievement; <p<p5:
device
impersonation attack; ¢¢6: malicious device deployment attack; <p<p7:
resilience against device physical capture attack; </J</Js:
formal security
proof of formal security analysis;
verification through AVISPA tool; <p<pg:
¢¢10: whether works without involving gateway node during the access
control process; ¢¢11: ephemeral secret leakage attack.
T: "protocol is secure against a particular attack or it supports a specific
functionality feature"; F: "protocol is insecure against a particular attack
or it does not support a specific functionality feature".

and 7Tecm + 6Th + 3Teca . The corresponding time values are
173.62, 204.05, 1.40 and 94.41, respectively. The schemes
of Braeken et al. [140] and Das et al. [145] performed better
from the computation cost point of view.
The communication costs of protocols of Luo et al. [141],
Li et al. [139], Braeken et al. [140] and Das et al. [145]
are 3040, 3488, 3552 and 3296, respectively (as shown
in Table 10. The protocols of Braeken Luo et al. [141] and
Das et al. [145] performed better from the communication
cost point of view.
D. EXISTING INTRUSION DETECTION PROTOCOLS
IN IoT ENVIRONMENT

The details of different intrusion detection protocols in IoT
environment are provided. Wazid et al. [61] designed a
intrusion detection mechanism for detecting and preventing
4481

IEEEAccess·

M. Wazid et al.: Security in 5G-Enabled IoT Communication: Issues, Challenges, and Future Research Roadmap

sinkhole attacker nodes in a cluster based wireless sensor
network. The operations were conducted in two phases,
in first phase it discovered the existence of mischievous nodes
through various network performance parameters. If a node
came under suspicious category then the steps of second
phase confirmed the node as the sinkhole attacker node
along with its types i.e., ‘‘sinkhole message modification
node’’, ‘‘sinkhole message dropping node’’ and ‘‘sinkhole
message delay node’’. Selvakumar et al. [146] presented a
intrusion detection protocol on the basis of temporal reasoning method. It had utilized ‘‘multi-class classification’’
through self designed mechanism called as ‘‘fuzzy and
rough set based nearest neighborhood algorithm (FRNN)’’.
Wazid et al. [60], [62] presented a intrusion detection method
for detecting blackhole attacker nodes and for ‘‘hybrid
anomaly’’ in a cluster based wireless sensor network. They
detected attacker nodes by the help of resource rich cluster head nodes. These proposed protocols are also applicable for the detection of intrusions in IoT environment.
Jan et al. [147] designed a light weight intrusion detection
technique for the mitigation of common type DOS attacks
in IoT. From the packet transmission rate, two-three features were extracted which they were utilized for the reduction of the overall time required to classify the various
flows of traffic. There were reduction in the complexity
and time required by ‘‘support vector machine (SVM)’’ for
the classification which results in an efficient mitigation
DOS attack. Sharma et al. [148] designed a light weight
detection technique based on behaviour rule specification
for ‘‘IoT-embedded cyber-physical systems’’. The existence
of intruder was detected via misbehaviour feature of an
existing node. In the designed mechanism they utilized a
‘‘profiler’’ which read the module and forward this data to
fuzzy analysis segment to verify the validity of behavior rules.
Pajouh et al. [149] presented a intrusion detection mechanism for different attacks happened in IoT environment. The
presented protocols used two mechanism for the reduction
of dimensions and for minimizing the number of features
required. The classification algorithm for example, ‘‘KNN’’
and ‘‘naive Bayes’’ were used for the detection of malign
nodes. Mudgerikar et al. [150] presented a client system
based intrusion detection protocol which utilized anomalies
based detection method. It was deployed with three layers of
security. But some drawbacks were there as with the increasing level of security the increment in the overhead occurred
i.e., computation and communication costs. In the first component of the detection module a white list was prepared during the learning process. It separated the legitimate processes
from the malicious processes. The comparisons was done on
the basis of IDs of the processes. In the second module classifier was trained using the generated logs obtained through
learning phase. However, it was very expensive procedure
because of the use of machine learning algorithms in the
resource constrained devices. Saeed et al. [151] presented
a intrusion detection technique consisted of two phases to
maintain the security in the system. The neural network was
4482

utilized in the first phase for the anomaly detection purpose.
Though in the second phase a tag system was deployed
for the anomaly detection. Then the anomaly detection was
conducted through tag-checking method. Wazid et al. [73]
designed an intrusion detection method to mitigate routing
attacks in an edge-based IoT environment. In this technique
they have used a resource rich edge node for the detection of
intrusion in the network.
1) COMPARATIVE STUDY OF EXISTING INTRUSION
DETECTION PROTOCOLS IN IoT ENVIRONMENT

The achievements of different intrusion detection method in
IoT environment are compared. For the performance analysis purpose, there are certain parameters which need to be
compared are explained as follows. The first parameter is
‘‘detection rate (DR)’’ (which is also called as ‘‘true positive
rate (TPR) or sensitivity or hit rate’’) and the second one is
‘‘false positive rate or fall out (FPR)’’. DR can be formulated
as ‘‘the number of attackers detected by a intrusion detection
scheme divided by the total number of attackers present in the
test sample’’ which is formulated as [60], [62],
TP
,
TP + FN
However, FPR is estimated as ‘‘the number of nodes falsely
detected as attacker nodes’’ which is computed as [60], [62],
DR =

FP
.
TN + FP
The results of various intrusion detection protocols in IoT environment such as Wazid et al. [61],
Wazid et al. [73], Selvakumar et al. [146], Wazid et al. [60],
Jan et al. [147], Sharma et al. [148], Pajouh et al. [149],
Mudgerikar et al. [150] and Saeed et al. [151] are provided.
The comparison of results are provided in Table 12. In the
analysis following things were observed:
• The ‘‘detection rate (DR)’’ for various methods such as
Wazid et al. [61], Wazid et al. [62], Wazid et al. [73],
Selvakumar et al. [146], Wazid et al. [60],
Jan et al. [147], Sharma et al. [148], Pajouh et al. [149],
Mudgerikar et al. [150] and Saeed et al. [151] are
95.00, 98.60, 95.00, 99.87, 90.00, 97.98, 97.80, 84.86,
99.00 and 97.23 respectively.
• The ‘‘false positive rate (FPR)’’ for various methods such as Wazid et al. [61], Wazid et al. [62],
Wazid et al. [73], Selvakumar et al. [146],
Wazid et al. [60], Jan et al. [147], Sharma et al. [148],
Pajouh et al. [149] and Saeed et al. [151] are 1.25, 1.20,
1.23, 0.13, 3.75, 44.48, 4.00, 4.86 and 3.48 respectively.
Computational power requirements for the methods of
Wazid et al. [61], Wazid et al. [62], Wazid et al. [73],
Wazid et al. [60], Selvakumar et al. [146], Jan et al. [147],
Pajouh et al. [149], Mudgerikar et al. [150], Saeed et al. [151]
and Sharma et al. [148] are O(n2 ), O(n2 ), O(n2 ), O(n), O(n),
O(n3 ), O(n), O(nlog(n)), O(n3 ) and O(nlog(n)) where n are
the number nodes deployed in the target area.
FPR =
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TABLE 12. Accuracy comparison of existing IDS in WSN and IoT.

Scheme, Year
Wazid et al. [61],
(2016)
Wazid et al. [62],
(2016)
Wazid et al. [73],
(2019)
Selvakumar et al. [146],
(2019)
Wazid et al. [60],
(2017)
Jan et al. [147],
(2019)
Sharma et al. [148],
(2019)
Pajouh et al. [149],
(2019)
Mudgerikar et al. [150],
(2019)
Saeed et al. [151],
(2016)
Note: NIA: not available

Detection rate
(DR)%

False positive
rate (FPR) %

95.00

1.25

98.60

1.20

95.00

1.23

99.87

0.13

90.00

3.75

97.98

44.48

97.80

4.00

84.86

4.86

99.00

NIA

97.23

3.48

Apart from that it is important to notice that the scheme of
Wazid et al. [61], Wazid et al. [73], Selvakumar et al. [146],
Wazid et al. [60], Pajouh et al. [149], Mudgerikar et al. [150]
and Saeed et al. [151] could be applied to achieve secuirty in
WSN as well as IoT networks. However, certain amendments
are required in their network model and nodes settings to
achieve that objective. Methods of Wazid et al. [62], Selvakumar et al. [146] and Mudgerikar et al. [150] performed better
with regard to true (detection) positive rate and false positive
rate.
VI. FUTURE RESEARCH CHALLENGES

5G-enabled IoT communications environment supports
various types of applications, such as smart home, smart
transportation, smart healthcare, smart grid and smart manufacturing. This environment requires solitary requirements
for example, live processing and accessing of data (i.e., environmental monitoring of an industrial plant in real-time).
Such environment generates very huge data (i.e., big data)
hence big data analytic process should be used on this data
to identify some specific patterns from this (e.g., possibilities
of an accident in a coal mine). In this environment all the
devices and users communicate through the Internet. Hence
it undergoes with some traditional security, privacy, and other
kind of challenges. In this part of the paper some of the current
challenges of this domain are discussed and further some
directions for research work are highlighted.
A. SECURITY OF THE EXISTING PROTOCOLS

Most of the security protocols proposed for IoT environment
insecure as they do not furnish the complete security against
the possible attacks. Furthermore, some of the existing protocols works for a particular attack and do not work for multiple
attacks concurrently. Hence, it is mandatory to design some
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security protocols which should concurrently protect multiple
attacks. Therefore, designing of such kind of protocols for
this domain is a challenging task which should be solved by
the future researchers [27].
B. EFFICIENT DESIGN OF SECURITY PROTOCOLS

5G-enabled IoT environment contains the resource constrained devices i.e., IoT sensors which have limited computation capability, limited storage size and small battery unit.
These devices are not able to execute communication, computation and storage demanding tasks which require more
strength in terms of these parameters. Hence it is desirable
to design security protocols to such a degree that they should
need low computation power, low communication cost and
small storage size without negotiating the security of the
system [27], [60], [61].
C. SCALABILITY OF SECURITY PROTOCOLS

5G-enabled IoT environment is a combination of heterogeneous network of different communication mechanism and
applications. These applications have their own abilities and
concerns. In such situations designing of a security protocol
for this kind of communication environment will be complex
task. For example, in an smart healthcare communication
environment, patient’s electronic health records which need
to be stored over a cloud server for further processing and
decision making. In an body area network (BANs), there
are different types of devices which generate data and then
forward it to the cloud server. This constitutes a ‘‘heterogeneous network’’ of different types of communicating devices.
Accordingly, some special types of security protocols which
can be employed to protect various types of devices of
5G-enabled IoT environment should be designed. Therefore,
more research work is needed in this area.
D. PRIVACY OF STORED DATA

The privacy of data concerns with the proper handling of
information over the various resource i.e., consent, notice,
and regulatory obligations. 5G-enabled IoT environment
is also utilized in ‘‘information sensitive’’ operations (like
smart healthcare). In this privacy-demanding environment,
the health monitoring smart devices are used around/inside
the body of a patient to monitor his/her health conditions.
Then the sensed and collected health data is sent to cloud
server(s) for further storage and processing. Usually, this type
of communication environment can be affected by different
potential attackers [23], [60], [62]. This may cause the leakage of data at transit and the data maintained over the servers.
Consequently, it is important to sustain the privacy of the data
at transit and also to the stored data. Hence new efficient
protocols are much needed to maintain the privacy of data.
Thenceforth, more research work is required in this direction.
E. HETEROGENEITY OF USED DEVICES

5G-enabled IoT environment consists of various types of
devices from powerful servers, laptops, personal digital
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assistants, desktops to resource restricted RFID tags and
sensing devices. Besides that, these devices work with various types of communication techniques. Devices are also
contrasting as per their communication strength, computation capacity, storage size and deployed system software
(e.g., operating system). Hence security protocols should
be designed in such fashion that it provides protection to
different varieties of devices and associated technologies and
mechanisms. Thenceforth, more research work is required in
this area [27], [60].
F. BLOCKCHAIN BASED SECURITY
PROTOCOLS DESIGNING

The operations of blockchain can also be utilized to secure the
5G-enabled IoT environment. Because blockchain operations
are decentralized, efficient and transparent to all entities of
the communication environment. To devise security protocols
in 5G-enabled IoT environment ‘‘blockchain operations’’ are
also applicable. To perform the required task a block consists
of the data about the required functionality e.g., authentication message, data message can be created and added it
to the blockchain. In view of that blockchain is provided
to legal network entities, then these entities can access the
data using the blocks of the blockchain. That work can be
accomplished in an effective way using the operation of
blockchain. Accordingly, designing of ‘‘blockchain based
security protocols’’ seems to be a good problem for the future
researchers [152], [153].
VII. LESSONS LEARNED

5G-enabled IoT environment provides delay efficient services. It has wide variety of applications, such as healthcare,
home automation, remote surgery, autonomous vehicle (AV),
virtual reality (VR), flying IoT drones, and security and
surveillance. This communication environment facilities dayto-day activities of the people. However, it also agonizes
from various ‘‘security and privacy’’ issues. To cope this,
researchers working in this area proposed various types of
security protocols under different categories, such as ‘‘key
management protocols’’, ‘‘authentication/ user authentication protocols’’, ‘‘access control/user access control protocols’’ and ‘‘intrusion detection’’. The intrusion detection
protocols are of three types like ‘‘misuse based detection’’,
‘‘anomaly based detection’’ and ‘‘specification based detection’’. ‘‘Specification based detection’’ scheme needs certain
constraints and specifications for its deployment. It uses the
advantages of the other two schemes. Its false positive rate
is also less as compared to the other detection schemes.
Inspite of that, it is bit inconvenient as it is time consuming,
we need some time in the defining and construction of the
required set. It detects ‘‘zero-day attacks’’ effectively. In this
detection scheme the intrusion detection happens efficiently
and effectively with less number of ‘‘false negatives’’ and
‘‘false positives’’ rates.
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The key management protocols of Li et al. [120],
Li et al. [121], Hu et al. [122], Mishra et al. [123],
Sharif et al. [124] and Wazid et al. [56] were compared and
analysed. The protocols of Li et al. [120], Li et al. [121],
Hu et al. [122] did not support most of the desired funtionalties and security lineaments, whereas the schemes of
Mishra et al. [123], Sharif et al. [124] did not provide the
support for environment of multiple servers. Inspite of that
the scheme of Wazid et al. [56] supported most of the functionalities and security lineaments.
The user authentication protocols of Challa et al. [11]
and Wazid et al. [138] provided most of functionalities and
security lineaments. But, the scheme of Challa et al. [11]
produced little more computational and communication
overheads. Hence, from the functionalities, secuirty lineaments and computation & communication costs point of
view, the scheme of Wazid et al. [138] seems finer than
Challa et al.’s method [11].
The access control mechanisms of Luo et al. [141],
Li et al. [139], and Braeken et al. [140] did not provide
the required functionalities and security lineaments, whereas
the method of Das et al. [145] provided most of the desired
functionalities and security lineaments along with less computation and communications costs.
The intrusion detection mechanisms of Wazid et al. [62],
Selvakumar et al. [146] and Mudgerikar et al. [150] performed better with regard to false positive rate and true
positive (detection) rate.
There are some future research directions of ‘‘security
in 5G-enabled IoT environment’’ such as ‘‘security of the
existing protocols’’, ‘‘efficient design of security protocols’’,
‘‘scalability of security protocols’’, ‘‘privacy of stored data’’,
‘‘heterogeneous nature of devices’’ and ‘‘use of blockchain in
the designing of security protocols’’. These topics should be
addressed in near future.
VIII. CONCLUSION

5G-enabled IoT environment suffers from various types of
‘‘security and privacy’’ issues as it is susceptible to various types of attacks. It becomes essential to protect the
infrastructure of 5G-enabled IoT environment against these
attacks. Therefore, different types of security protocols under
different categories (for example, ‘‘key management’’, ‘‘user
authentication/device authentication’’, ‘‘access control/user
access control’’ and ‘‘intrusion detection’’) came into picture.
In this survey article, the details of various system models (for
example, network model and threat model) are provided for
5G-enabled IoT environment. Various security requirements
and attacks possible in this communication environment are
also outlined. The different types of categories of security
protocols are then prepared. The different types of analysis
of the existing security protocols in 5G-enabled IoT environment are also organized. Lastly, some challenging problem
of future in the security of 5G-enabled IoT environment are
displayed to help the researchers working in the same domain.

VOLUME 9, 2021

M. Wazid et al.: Security in 5G-Enabled IoT Communication: Issues, Challenges, and Future Research Roadmap

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

The authors thank the anonymous reviewers and the associate
editor for their valuable feedback on the paper which helped
them to improve its quality and presentation.
REFERENCES
[1] R. Khan, P. Kumar, D. N. K. Jayakody, and M. Liyanage, ‘‘A survey on security and privacy of 5G technologies: Potential solutions, recent advancements, and future directions,’’ IEEE Commun.
Surveys Tuts., vol. 22, no. 1, pp. 196–248, 1st Quart., 2020, doi:
10.1109/COMST.2019.2933899.
[2] A. Ahad, M. Tahir, and K.-L.-A. Yau, ‘‘5G-based smart healthcare
network: Architecture, taxonomy, challenges and future research directions,’’ IEEE Access, vol. 7, pp. 100747–100762, 2019.
[3] A. Braeken, M. Liyanage, P. Kumar, and J. Murphy, ‘‘Novel 5G authentication protocol to improve the resistance against active attacks and
malicious serving networks,’’ IEEE Access, vol. 7, pp. 64040–64052,
2019.
[4] Ericsson. (2019). What is 5G? Accessed: Oct. 2019. [Online]. Available:
https://www.ericsson.com/en/5g
[5] Qualcomm. (2019). Everything You Need to Know About 5G. Accessed:
Oct. 2019. [Online]. Available: https://www.qualcomm.com/invention/5g
[6] Northeast Now. China: Shanghai’s Hongkou District Becomes First
With 5G Network in World. Accessed: Dec. 2019. [Online]. Available:
https://nenow.in/neighbour/china-shanghais-hongkou-district-becomesfirst-with-5g-network-in-world.html
[7] I. Ahmad, T. Kumar, M. Liyanage, J. Okwuibe, M. Ylianttila, and
A. Gurtov, ‘‘Overview of 5G security challenges and solutions,’’ IEEE
Commun. Standards Mag., vol. 2, no. 1, pp. 36–43, Mar. 2018.
[8] P. Gandotra and R. K. Jha, ‘‘A survey on green communication and
security challenges in 5G wireless communication networks,’’ J. Netw.
Comput. Appl., vol. 96, pp. 39–61, Oct. 2017.
[9] Z. Tian, Y. Sun, S. Su, M. Li, X. Du, and M. Guizani, ‘‘Automated attack and defense framework for 5G security on physical and logical layers,’’ 2019, arXiv:1902.04009. [Online]. Available:
http://arxiv.org/abs/1902.04009
[10] H. Lee. (2015). Concept and Characteristics of 5G Mobile
Communication Systems. Accessed: Oct. 2019. [Online]. Available:
https://www.netmanias.com/en/post/blog/7109/5g-iot/concept-andcharacteristics-of-5g-mobile- communication-systems-1
[11] S. Challa, M. Wazid, A. K. Das, N. Kumar, A. G. Reddy, E.-J. Yoon,
and K.-Y. Yoo, ‘‘Secure signature-based authenticated key establishment
scheme for future IoT applications,’’ IEEE Access, vol. 5, pp. 3028–3043,
2017.
[12] S. Challa, M. Wazid, A. K. Das, and M. K. Khan, ‘‘Authentication
protocols for implantable medical devices: Taxonomy, analysis and future
directions,’’ IEEE Consum. Electron. Mag., vol. 7, no. 1, pp. 57–65,
Jan. 2018.
[13] M. Wazid, A. K. Das, N. Kumar, M. Conti, and A. V. Vasilakos,
‘‘A novel authentication and key agreement scheme for implantable medical devices deployment,’’ IEEE J. Biomed. Health Informat., vol. 22,
no. 4, pp. 1299–1309, Jul. 2018.
[14] M. Wazid, A. K. Das, V. Odelu, N. Kumar, and W. Susilo, ‘‘Secure
remote user authenticated key establishment protocol for smart home
environment,’’ IEEE Trans. Dependable Secure Comput., vol. 17, no. 2,
pp. 391–406, Mar. 2020.
[15] V. Hassija, V. Chamola, V. Saxena, D. Jain, P. Goyal, and B. Sikdar,
‘‘A survey on IoT security: Application areas, security threats, and solution architectures,’’ IEEE Access, vol. 7, pp. 82721–82743, 2019.
[16] S. Bera, S. Misra, and A. V. Vasilakos, ‘‘Software-defined networking
for Internet of Things: A survey,’’ IEEE Internet Things J., vol. 4, no. 6,
pp. 1994–2008, Dec. 2017.
[17] J. Granjal, E. Monteiro, and J. Sa Silva, ‘‘Security for the Internet of
Things: A survey of existing protocols and open research issues,’’ IEEE
Commun. Surveys Tuts., vol. 17, no. 3, pp. 1294–1312, 3rd Quart., 2015.
[18] A. Al-Fuqaha, M. Guizani, M. Mohammadi, M. Aledhari, and M. Ayyash,
‘‘Internet of Things: A survey on enabling technologies, protocols,
and applications,’’ IEEE Commun. Surveys Tuts., vol. 17, no. 4,
pp. 2347–2376, Jun. 2015.
[19] RedAlkemi. (2018). Pros & Cons of Internet of Things. Accessed:
Oct. 2019. [Online]. Available: https://www.redalkemi.com/blog/post/
pros-cons-of-internet-of-things
VOLUME 9, 2021

IEEEAccess·

[20] M. A. Ferrag, L. A. Maglaras, H. Janicke, J. Jiang, and L. Shu,
‘‘Authentication protocols for Internet of Things: A comprehensive survey,’’ Secur. Commun. Netw., vol. 2017, pp. 1–42, Nov. 2017, doi:
10.1155/2017/6562953.
[21] P. Kumar, A. Gurtov, J. Iinatti, M. Ylianttila, and M. Sain, ‘‘Lightweight
and secure session-key establishment scheme in smart home environments,’’ IEEE Sensors J., vol. 16, no. 1, pp. 254–264, Jan. 2016.
[22] A. K. Das, M. Wazid, N. Kumar, A. V. Vasilakos, and J. J. P. C. Rodrigues,
‘‘Biometrics-based privacy-preserving user authentication scheme for
cloud-based industrial Internet of Things deployment,’’ IEEE Internet
Things J., vol. 5, no. 6, pp. 4900–4913, Dec. 2018.
[23] M. Wazid, A. K. Das, and A. V. Vasilakos, ‘‘Authenticated key management protocol for cloud-assisted body area sensor networks,’’ J. Netw.
Comput. Appl., vol. 123, pp. 112–126, Dec. 2018.
[24] A. K. Das, M. Wazid, A. R. Yannam, J. J. P. C. Rodrigues, and Y. Park,
‘‘Provably secure ECC-based device access control and key agreement
protocol for IoT environment,’’ IEEE Access, vol. 7, pp. 55382–55397,
2019.
[25] R.-H. Hsu, J. Lee, T. Q. S. Quek, and J.-C. Chen, ‘‘Reconfigurable security: Edge-computing-based framework for IoT,’’ IEEE Netw., vol. 32,
no. 5, pp. 92–99, Sep. 2018.
[26] P. Gope, ‘‘LAAP: Lightweight anonymous authentication protocol
for D2D-aided fog computing paradigm,’’ Comput. Secur., vol. 86,
pp. 223–237, Sep. 2019.
[27] M. Wazid, A. K. Das, R. Hussain, G. Succi, and J. J. P. C. Rodrigues,
‘‘Authentication in cloud-driven IoT-based big data environment: Survey
and outlook,’’ J. Syst. Archit., vol. 97, pp. 185–196, Aug. 2019.
[28] P. D. Baruah, S. Dhir, and M. Hooda, ‘‘Impact of IoT in current era,’’
in Proc. Int. Conf. Mach. Learn., Big Data, Cloud Parallel Comput.
(COMITCon), Feb. 2019, pp. 334–339.
[29] G. Kobayashi, ‘‘The ethical impact of the Internet of Things in social
relationships: Technological mediation and mutual trust,’’ IEEE Consum.
Electron. Mag., vol. 5, no. 3, pp. 85–89, Jul. 2016.
[30] D. Niyato, X. Lu, P. Wang, D. I. Kim, and Z. Han, ‘‘Economics of Internet
of Things: An information market approach,’’ IEEE Wireless Commun.,
vol. 23, no. 4, pp. 136–145, Aug. 2016.
[31] M. A. Khan and K. Salah, ‘‘IoT security: Review, blockchain solutions,
and open challenges,’’ Future Gener. Comput. Syst., vol. 82, pp. 395–411,
May 2018.
[32] A. K. Das, S. Zeadally, and D. He, ‘‘Taxonomy and analysis of security
protocols for Internet of Things,’’ Future Gener. Comput. Syst., vol. 89,
pp. 110–125, Dec. 2018.
[33] W. Zhou, Y. Jia, A. Peng, Y. Zhang, and P. Liu, ‘‘The effect of IoT
new features on security and privacy: New threats, existing solutions,
and challenges yet to be solved,’’ IEEE Internet Things J., vol. 6, no. 2,
pp. 1606–1616, Apr. 2019.
[34] M. B. M. Noor and W. H. Hassan, ‘‘Current research on Internet of
Things (IoT) security: A survey,’’ Comput. Netw., vol. 148, pp. 283–294,
Jan. 2019.
[35] J. Sengupta, S. Ruj, and S. D. Bit, ‘‘A comprehensive survey on attacks,
security issues and blockchain solutions for IoT and IIoT,’’ J. Netw.
Comput. Appl., vol. 149, Jan. 2020, Art. no. 102481.
[36] Devices & Systems, IoT Tech Expo. (2019). Unlocking IoT
Data With 5G and AI. Accessed: Oct. 2019. [Online]. Available:
https://innovate.ieee.org/innovation-spotlight/5g-iot-ai/
[37] M. Wazid, P. Bagga, A. K. Das, S. Shetty, J. J. P. C. Rodrigues, and Y. Park,
‘‘AKM-IoV: Authenticated key management protocol in fog computingbased Internet of vehicles deployment,’’ IEEE Internet Things J., vol. 6,
no. 5, pp. 8804–8817, Oct. 2019.
[38] M. Ayaz, M. Ammad-Uddin, Z. Sharif, A. Mansour, and
E.-H.-M. Aggoune, ‘‘Internet-of-Things (IoT)-based smart agriculture:
Toward making the fields talk,’’ IEEE Access, vol. 7, pp. 129551–129583,
2019.
[39] King’s Healthcare. (2019). A Healing Hand-Giving the World
Better Access to Medical Experts Through the Tactile Internet.
Accessed: Oct. 2019. [Online]. Available: https://www.ericsson.com/en/
cases/2017/kings-college/kings-healthcare
[40] M. Wazid, A. K. Das, and J.-H. Lee, ‘‘User authentication in a tactile Internet based remote surgery environment: Security issues, challenges, and
future research directions,’’ Pervas. Mobile Comput., vol. 54, pp. 71–85,
Mar. 2019.
[41] R. Hussain and S. Zeadally, ‘‘Autonomous cars: Research results, issues,
and future challenges,’’ IEEE Commun. Surveys Tuts., vol. 21, no. 2,
pp. 1275–1313, 2nd Quart., 2019.
4485

IEEEAccess·

M. Wazid et al.: Security in 5G-Enabled IoT Communication: Issues, Challenges, and Future Research Roadmap

[42] M. A. Imran, Y. A. Sambo, and Q. H. Abbasi, ‘‘Evolution of vehicular
communications within the context of 5G systems,’’ in Enabling 5G
Communication Systems to Support Vertical Industries. Piscataway, NJ,
USA: IEEE, 2019, pp. 103–126, doi: 10.1002/9781119515579.ch5.
[43] K. Jo and M. Sunwoo, ‘‘Generation of a precise roadway map for
autonomous cars,’’ IEEE Trans. Intell. Transp. Syst., vol. 15, no. 3,
pp. 925–937, Jun. 2014.
[44] MWC. Limitless Intelligent Connectivity. Accessed: Oct. 2019. [Online].
Available: https://www.mwcbarcelona.com/
[45] M. Shafi, A. F. Molisch, P. J. Smith, T. Haustein, P. Zhu, P. De Silva,
F. Tufvesson, A. Benjebbour, and G. Wunder, ‘‘5G: A tutorial overview
of standards, trials, challenges, deployment, and practice,’’ IEEE J. Sel.
Areas Commun., vol. 35, no. 6, pp. 1201–1221, Jun. 2017.
[46] F. Alvarez, D. Breitgand, D. Griffin, P. Andriani, S. Rizou, N. Zioulis,
F. Moscatelli, J. Serrano, M. Keltsch, P. Trakadas, T. K. Phan, A. Weit,
U. Acar, O. Prieto, F. Iadanza, G. Carrozzo, H. Koumaras, D. Zarpalas,
and D. Jimenez, ‘‘An edge-to-cloud virtualized multimedia service
platform for 5G networks,’’ IEEE Trans. Broadcast., vol. 65, no. 2,
pp. 369–380, Jun. 2019.
[47] M. Gharibi, R. Boutaba, and S. L. Waslander, ‘‘Internet of drones,’’ IEEE
Access, vol. 4, pp. 1148–1162, 2016.
[48] M. Wazid, A. K. Das, N. Kumar, A. V. Vasilakos, and J. J. P. C. Rodrigues,
‘‘Design and analysis of secure lightweight remote user authentication
and key agreement scheme in Internet of drones deployment,’’ IEEE
Internet Things J., vol. 6, no. 2, pp. 3572–3584, Apr. 2019.
[49] N. H. Motlagh, M. Bagaa, and T. Taleb, ‘‘UAV-based IoT platform:
A crowd surveillance use case,’’ IEEE Commun. Mag., vol. 55, no. 2,
pp. 128–134, Feb. 2017.
[50] M. Alam, J. Ferreira, S. Mumtaz, M. A. Jan, R. Rebelo, and J. A. Fonseca,
‘‘Smart cameras are making our beaches safer: A 5G-envisioned distributed architecture for safe, connected coastal areas,’’ IEEE Veh. Technol. Mag., vol. 12, no. 4, pp. 50–59, Dec. 2017.
[51] S. A. R. Naqvi, S. A. Hassan, H. Pervaiz, and Q. Ni, ‘‘Drone-aided communication as a key enabler for 5G and resilient public safety networks,’’
IEEE Commun. Mag., vol. 56, no. 1, pp. 36–42, Jan. 2018.
[52] M. Condoluci and T. Mahmoodi, ‘‘Softwarization and virtualization in
5G mobile networks: Benefits, trends and challenges,’’ Comput. Netw.,
vol. 146, pp. 65–84, Dec. 2018.
[53] M. A. Imran, Y. A. Sambo, and Q. H. Abbasi, ‘‘5G communication
systems and connected healthcare,’’ in Enabling 5G Communication
Systems to Support Vertical Industries. Piscataway, NJ, USA: IEEE, 2019,
pp. 149–177, doi: 10.1002/9781119515579.ch7.
[54] Q. Wang, D. Chen, N. Zhang, Z. Qin, and Z. Qin, ‘‘LACS: A lightweight
label-based access control scheme in IoT-based 5G caching context,’’
IEEE Access, vol. 5, pp. 4018–4027, 2017.
[55] M. Wazid, A. K. Das, V. Odelu, N. Kumar, M. Conti, and M. Jo, ‘‘Design
of secure user authenticated key management protocol for generic IoT
networks,’’ IEEE Internet Things J., vol. 5, no. 1, pp. 269–282, Feb. 2018.
[56] M. Wazid, A. K. Das, N. Kumar, and A. V. Vasilakos, ‘‘Design of secure
key management and user authentication scheme for fog computing
services,’’ Future Gener. Comput. Syst., vol. 91, pp. 475–492, Feb. 2019.
[57] D. Dolev and A. Yao, ‘‘On the security of public key protocols,’’ IEEE
Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 29, no. 2, pp. 198–208, Mar. 1983.
[58] R. Canetti and H. Krawczyk, ‘‘Universally composable notions of
key exchange and secure channels,’’ in Advances in Cryptology,
L. R. Knudsen, Ed. Amsterdam, The Netherlands: Springer, 2002,
pp. 337–351.
[59] T. S. Messerges, E. A. Dabbish, and R. H. Sloan, ‘‘Examining smartcard security under the threat of power analysis attacks,’’ IEEE Trans.
Comput., vol. 51, no. 5, pp. 541–552, May 2002.
[60] M. Wazid and A. K. Das, ‘‘A secure group-based blackhole node detection scheme for hierarchical wireless sensor networks,’’ Wireless Pers.
Commun., vol. 94, no. 3, pp. 1165–1191, Jun. 2017.
[61] M. Wazid, A. K. Das, S. Kumari, and M. K. Khan, ‘‘Design of sinkhole
node detection mechanism for hierarchical wireless sensor networks,’’
Secur. Commun. Netw., vol. 9, no. 17, pp. 4596–4614, Nov. 2016.
[62] M. Wazid and A. K. Das, ‘‘An efficient hybrid anomaly detection scheme
using K-means clustering for wireless sensor networks,’’ Wireless Pers.
Commun., vol. 90, no. 4, pp. 1971–2000, Oct. 2016.
[63] S. Sahmim and H. Gharsellaoui, ‘‘Privacy and security in Internetbased computing: Cloud computing, Internet of Things, cloud of things:
A review,’’ Procedia Comput. Sci., vol. 112, pp. 1516–1522, Jan. 2017.
4486

[64] A. Assiri and H. Almagwashi, ‘‘IoT security and privacy issues,’’ in Proc.
1st Int. Conf. Comput. Appl. Inf. Secur. (ICCAIS), Riyadh, Saudi Arabia,
Apr. 2018, pp. 1–5.
[65] J. Hou, L. Qu, and W. Shi, ‘‘A survey on Internet of Things security from
data perspectives,’’ Comput. Netw., vol. 148, pp. 295–306, Jan. 2019.
[66] Y. Yang, L. Wu, G. Yin, L. Li, and H. Zhao, ‘‘A survey on security and
privacy issues in Internet-of-Things,’’ IEEE Internet Things J., vol. 4,
no. 5, pp. 1250–1258, Oct. 2017.
[67] M. A. Al-Garadi, A. Mohamed, A. K. Al-Ali, X. Du, I. Ali, and
M. Guizani, ‘‘A survey of machine and deep learning methods for Internet
of Things (IoT) security,’’ IEEE Commun. Surveys Tuts., vol. 22, no. 3,
pp. 1646–1685, 3rd Quart., 2020.
[68] W. Stallings, Cryptography and Network Security: Principles and Practice, 5th ed. Upper Saddle River, NJ, USA: Prentice-Hall, 2010.
[69] A. K. Das and S. Zeadally, ‘‘Data security in the smart grid environment,’’ in Pathways to a Smarter Power System, A. Tascikaraoglu
and O. Erdinc, Eds. New York, NY, USA: Academic, 2019, ch. 13,
pp. 371–395.
[70] S. U. Jan, S. Ahmed, V. Shakhov, and I. Koo, ‘‘Toward a lightweight
intrusion detection system for the Internet of Things,’’ IEEE Access,
vol. 7, pp. 42450–42471, 2019.
[71] H. Chen, C. Meng, Z. Shan, Z. Fu, and B. K. Bhargava, ‘‘A novel
low-rate denial of service attack detection approach in ZigBee wireless
sensor network by combining Hilbert–Huang transformation and trust
evaluation,’’ IEEE Access, vol. 7, pp. 32853–32866, 2019.
[72] Kamaldeep, M. Malik, and M. Dutta, ‘‘Contiki-based mitigation of UDP
flooding attacks in the Internet of Things,’’ in Proc. Int. Conf. Comput., Commun. Automat. (ICCCA), Greater Noida, India, May 2017,
pp. 1296–1300, doi: 10.1109/CCAA.2017.8229997.
[73] M. Wazid, P. R. Dsouza, A. K. Das, V. K. Bhat, N. Kumar, and
J. J. P. C. Rodrigues, ‘‘RAD-EI: A routing attack detection scheme for
edge-based Internet of Things environment,’’ Int. J. Commun. Syst.,
vol. 32, no. 15, p. e4024, Oct. 2019, doi: 10.1002/dac.4024.
[74] How to Avoid the Dreaded Computer Virus. Accessed: Oct. 2019.
[Online]. Available: http://www.magellansolutions.co.uk/malware.html
[75] M. Korolov. (2019). What is a Botnet? When Armies of Infected
IoT Devices Attack. Accessed: Oct. 2019. [Online]. Available:
https://www.csoonline.com/article/3240364/what-is-a-botnet.html
[76] C. Kolias, G. Kambourakis, A. Stavrou, and J. Voas, ‘‘DDoS in the IoT:
Mirai and other botnets,’’ Computer, vol. 50, no. 7, pp. 80–84, 2017.
[77] G. Kambourakis, C. Kolias, and A. Stavrou, ‘‘The mirai botnet and
the IoT zombie armies,’’ in Proc. IEEE Mil. Commun. Conf. (MILCOM), Baltimore, MD, USA, Oct. 2017, pp. 267–272, doi: 10.1109/MILCOM.2017.8170867.
[78] H. Sinanovic and S. Mrdovic, ‘‘Analysis of mirai malicious software,’’ in Proc. 25th Int. Conf. Softw., Telecommun. Comput. Netw.
(SoftCOM), Split, Croatia, Sep. 2017, pp. 1–5, doi: 10.23919/SOFTCOM.2017.8115504.
[79] H. Semic and S. Mrdovic, ‘‘IoT honeypot: A multi-component solution
for handling manual and mirai-based attacks,’’ in Proc. 25th Telecommun. Forum (TELFOR), Belgrade, Serbia, Nov. 2017, pp. 1–4, doi:
10.1109/TELFOR.2017.8249458.
[80] A. Kumar and T. J. Lim, ‘‘EDIMA: Early detection of IoT malware
network activity using machine learning techniques,’’ in Proc. IEEE 5th
World Forum Internet Things (WF-IoT), Limerick, Ireland, Apr. 2019,
pp. 289–294, doi: 10.1109/WF-IoT.2019.8767194.
[81] T. Kelley and E. Furey, ‘‘Getting prepared for the next botnet attack:
Detecting algorithmically generated domains in botnet command and
control,’’ in Proc. 29th Irish Signals Syst. Conf. (ISSC), Belfast, Ireland,
Jun. 2018, pp. 1–6, doi: 10.1109/ISSC.2018.8585344.
[82] T. Lei, Z. Qin, Z. Wang, Q. Li, and D. Ye, ‘‘EveDroid: Event-aware
Android malware detection against model degrading for IoT devices,’’
IEEE Internet Things J., vol. 6, no. 4, pp. 6668–6680, Aug. 2019.
[83] H.-T. Nguyen, Q.-D. Ngo, and V.-H. Le, ‘‘IoT botnet detection approach
based on PSI graph and DGCNN classifier,’’ in Proc. IEEE Int. Conf. Inf.
Commun. Signal Process. (ICICSP), Singapore, Sep. 2018, pp. 118–122,
doi: 10.1109/ICICSP.2018.8549713.
[84] S. M. P. Dinakarrao, H. Sayadi, H. M. Makrani, C. Nowzari, S. Rafatirad,
and H. Homayoun, ‘‘Lightweight node-level malware detection and
network-level malware confinement in IoT networks,’’ in Proc. Design,
Automat. Test Eur. Conf. Exhib. (DATE), Florence, Italy, Mar. 2019,
pp. 776–781, doi: 10.23919/DATE.2019.8715057.
VOLUME 9, 2021

M. Wazid et al.: Security in 5G-Enabled IoT Communication: Issues, Challenges, and Future Research Roadmap

[85] M. Wazid, A. K. Das, J. J. P. C. Rodrigues, S. Shetty, and Y. Park, ‘‘IoMT
malware detection approaches: Analysis and research challenges,’’ IEEE
Access, vol. 7, pp. 182459–182476, 2019.
[86] Y.-W. Kao, K.-Y. Huang, H.-Z. Gu, and S.-M. Yuan, ‘‘UCloud: A usercentric key management scheme for cloud data protection,’’ IET Inf.
Secur., vol. 7, no. 2, pp. 144–154, Jun. 2013.
[87] J. Li, X. Chen, M. Li, J. Li, P. P. C. Lee, and W. Lou, ‘‘Secure deduplication with efficient and reliable convergent key management,’’ IEEE
Trans. Parallel Distrib. Syst., vol. 25, no. 6, pp. 1615–1625, Jun. 2014.
[88] P. K. Tysowski and M. A. Hasan, ‘‘Hybrid attribute- and re-encryptionbased key management for secure and scalable mobile applications in
clouds,’’ IEEE Trans. Cloud Comput., vol. 1, no. 2, pp. 172–186, 2013.
[89] J. Yu, K. Ren, C. Wang, and V. Varadharajan, ‘‘Enabling cloud storage
auditing with key-exposure resistance,’’ IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Security, vol. 10, no. 6, pp. 1167–1179, Jun. 2015.
[90] L. Eschenauer and V. D. Gligor, ‘‘A key management scheme for distributed sensor networks,’’ in Proc. 9th ACM Conf. Comput. Commun.
Secur., Nov. 2002, pp. 41–47.
[91] H. Chan, A. Perrig, and D. Song, ‘‘Random key predistribution schemes
for sensor networks,’’ in Proc. 19th Int. Conf. Data Eng., Berkeley, CA,
USA, 2003, pp. 197–213.
[92] W. Du, J. Deng, Y. S. Han, S. Chen, and P. K. Varshney, ‘‘A key management scheme for wireless sensor networks using deployment knowledge,’’ in Proc. 23rd Conf. IEEE Commun. Soc. (Infocom), Hong Kong,
vol. 1, Mar. 2004, pp. 586–597.
[93] W. Du, J. Deng, Y. S. Han, and P. K. Varshney, ‘‘A pairwise key predistribution scheme for wireless sensor networks,’’ in Proc. 10th ACM
Conf. Comput. Commun. Secur. (CCS), Washington, DC, USA, Oct. 2003,
pp. 42–51.
[94] C. Blundo, A. D. Santis, A. Herzberg, S. Kutten, U. Vaccaro, and
M. Yung, ‘‘Perfectly-secure key distribution for dynamic conferences,’’ in
Advances in Cryptology (Lecture Notes in Computer Science), vol. 740.
Berlin, Germany: Springer, Aug. 1993, pp. 471–486.
[95] Y. Cheng and D. Agrawal, ‘‘Efficient pairwise key establishment and
management in static wireless sensor networks,’’ in Proc. 2nd IEEE Int.
Conf. Mobile Ad Hoc Sensor Syst., Washington, DC, USA, Nov. 2005,
p. 7.
[96] D. Liu, P. Ning, and W. Du, ‘‘Group-based key pre-distribution in wireless sensor networks,’’ in Proc. ACM Workshop Wireless Secur. (WiSe),
Sep. 2005, pp. 1–14.
[97] Q. Dong and D. Liu, ‘‘Using auxiliary sensors for pairwise key establishment in WSN,’’ in Proc. IFIP Int. Conf. Netw. (Networking), in Lecture
Notes in Computer Science, vol. 4479, 2007, pp. 251–262.
[98] S. Zhu, S. Setia, and S. Jajodia, ‘‘LEAP+: Efficient security mechanisms
for large-scale distributed sensor networks,’’ ACM Trans. Sensor Netw.,
vol. 2, no. 4, pp. 500–528, Nov. 2006.
[99] A. Perrig, R. Szewczyk, J. D. Tygar, V. Wen, and D. E. Culler, ‘‘SPINS:
Security protocols for sensor networks,’’ Wireless Netw., vol. 8, no. 5,
pp. 521–534, Sep. 2002.
[100] D. Liu, P. Ning, and R. Li, ‘‘Establishing pairwise keys in distributed
sensor networks,’’ ACM Trans. Inf. Syst. Secur., vol. 8, no. 1, pp. 41–77,
Feb. 2005.
[101] A. K. Das, ‘‘An identity-based random key pre-distribution scheme for
direct key establishment to prevent attacks in wireless sensor networks,’’
Int. J. Netw. Secur., vol. 6, no. 2, pp. 134–144, 2008.
[102] A. K. Das, ‘‘ECPKS: An improved location-aware key management
scheme in static sensor networks,’’ Int. J. Netw. Secur., vol. 7, no. 3,
pp. 358–369, 2008.
[103] A. K. Das, ‘‘A random key establishment scheme for multi-phase deployment in large-scale distributed sensor networks,’’ Int. J. Inf. Secur., vol. 11,
no. 3, pp. 189–211, Jun. 2012.
[104] M. Wazid, A. K. Das, N. Kumar, and J. J. P. C. Rodrigues, ‘‘Secure threefactor user authentication scheme for renewable-energy-based smart grid
environment,’’ IEEE Trans. Ind. Informat., vol. 13, no. 6, pp. 3144–3153,
Dec. 2017.
[105] D. He, N. Kumar, M. K. Khan, L. Wang, and J. Shen, ‘‘Efficient privacyaware authentication scheme for mobile cloud computing services,’’ IEEE
Syst. J., vol. 12, no. 2, pp. 1621–1631, Jun. 2018.
[106] L. Wu, J. Wang, K.-K.-R. Choo, and D. He, ‘‘Secure key agreement and
key protection for mobile device user authentication,’’ IEEE Trans. Inf.
Forensics Security, vol. 14, no. 2, pp. 319–330, Feb. 2019.
[107] D. Wang, H. Cheng, D. He, and P. Wang, ‘‘On the challenges in designing identity-based privacy-preserving authentication schemes for mobile
devices,’’ IEEE Syst. J., vol. 12, no. 1, pp. 916–925, Mar. 2018.
VOLUME 9, 2021

IEEEAccess·

[108] F. Wu, L. Xu, S. Kumari, X. Li, J. Shen, K.-K.-R. Choo, M. Wazid, and
A. K. Das, ‘‘An efficient authentication and key agreement scheme for
multi-gateway wireless sensor networks in IoT deployment,’’ J. Netw.
Comput. Appl., vol. 89, pp. 72–85, Jul. 2017.
[109] M. Wazid, A. K. Das, S. Kumari, X. Li, and F. Wu, ‘‘Provably secure
biometric-based user authentication and key agreement scheme in cloud
computing,’’ Secur. Commun. Netw., vol. 9, no. 17, pp. 4103–4119,
Nov. 2016.
[110] S. Ding, J. Cao, C. Li, K. Fan, and H. Li, ‘‘A novel attribute-based
access control scheme using blockchain for IoT,’’ IEEE Access, vol. 7,
pp. 38431–38441, 2019.
[111] K. Riad, R. Hamza, and H. Yan, ‘‘Sensitive and energetic IoT access
control for managing cloud electronic health records,’’ IEEE Access,
vol. 7, pp. 86384–86393, 2019.
[112] Z. Liu, L. Zhang, Q. Ni, J. Chen, R. Wang, Y. Li, and Y. He, ‘‘An integrated
architecture for IoT malware analysis and detection,’’ in IoT as a Service,
B. Li, M. Yang, H. Yuan, and Z. Yan, Eds. Cham, Switzerland: Springer,
2019, pp. 127–137.
[113] J. Su, V. D. Vasconcellos, S. Prasad, S. Daniele, Y. Feng, and K. Sakurai,
‘‘Lightweight classification of IoT malware based on image recognition,’’
in Proc. IEEE 42nd Annu. Comput. Softw. Appl. Conf. (COMPSAC),
Tokyo, Japan, vol. 2, Jul. 2018, pp. 664–669.
[114] V. Clincy and H. Shahriar, ‘‘IoT malware analysis,’’ in Proc. IEEE 43rd
Annu. Comput. Softw. Appl. Conf. (COMPSAC), Milwaukee, WI, USA,
vol. 1, Jul. 2019, pp. 920–921.
[115] H. Takase, R. Kobayashi, M. Kato, and R. Ohmura, ‘‘A prototype implementation and evaluation of the malware detection mechanism for IoT
devices using the processor information,’’ Int. J. Inf. Secur., vol. 19, no. 1,
pp. 71–81, Feb. 2020, doi: 10.1007/s10207-019-00437-y.
[116] A. Azmoodeh, A. Dehghantanha, and K.-K.-R. Choo, ‘‘Robust malware detection for Internet of (battlefield) things devices using deep
Eigenspace learning,’’ IEEE Trans. Sustain. Comput., vol. 4, no. 1,
pp. 88–95, Jan. 2019.
[117] S. Pundir, M. Wazid, D. P. Singh, A. K. Das, J. J. P. C. Rodrigues, and
Y. Park, ‘‘Intrusion detection protocols in wireless sensor networks integrated to Internet of Things deployment: Survey and future challenges,’’
IEEE Access, vol. 8, pp. 3343–3363, 2020.
[118] V. Bhuse and A. Gupta, ‘‘Anomaly intrusion detection in wireless sensor
networks,’’ J. High Speed Netw., vol. 15, no. 1, pp. 33–51, 2006.
[119] I. Butun, S. D. Morgera, and R. Sankar, ‘‘A survey of intrusion detection
systems in wireless sensor networks,’’ IEEE Commun. Surveys Tuts.,
vol. 16, no. 1, pp. 266–282, 1st Quart., 2014.
[120] H. Li, Y. Dai, L. Tian, and H. Yang, ‘‘Identity-based authentication
for cloud computing,’’ in Cloud Computing. Berlin, Germany: Springer,
2009, pp. 157–166.
[121] H. Li, F. Li, C. Song, and Y. Yan, ‘‘Towards smart card based mutual
authentication schemes in cloud computing,’’ KSII Trans. Internet Inf.
Syst., vol. 9, no. 7, pp. 2719–2735, 2015.
[122] P. Hu, H. Ning, T. Qiu, H. Song, Y. Wang, and X. Yao, ‘‘Security
and privacy preservation scheme of face identification and resolution
framework using fog computing in Internet of Things,’’ IEEE Internet
Things J., vol. 4, no. 5, pp. 1143–1155, Oct. 2017.
[123] D. Mishra, P. Vijayakumar, V. Sureshkumar, R. Amin, S. H. Islam,
and P. Gope, ‘‘Efficient authentication protocol for secure multimedia
communications in IoT-enabled wireless sensor networks,’’ Multimedia
Tools Appl., vol. 77, no. 14, pp. 18295–18325, Jul. 2018.
[124] A.
Ostad-Sharif,
H.
Arshad,
M.
Nikooghadam,
and
D. Abbasinezhad-Mood, ‘‘Three party secure data transmission in
IoT networks through design of a lightweight authenticated key
agreement scheme,’’ Future Gener. Comput. Syst., vol. 100, pp. 882–892,
Nov. 2019.
[125] AVISPA. (2019). Automated Validation of Internet Security Protocols and Applications. Accessed: Oct. 2019. [Online]. Available:
http://www.avispa-project.org/
[126] M. Abdalla, P. A. Fouque, and D. Pointcheval, ‘‘Password-based authenticated key exchange in the three-party setting,’’ in Proc. 8th Int. Workshop Theory Pract. Public Key Cryptography (PKC), in Lecture Notes
in Computer Science, Les Diablerets, Switzerland, vol. 3386, 2005,
pp. 65–84.
[127] Y. Dodis, L. Reyzin, and A. Smith, ‘‘Fuzzy extractors: How to generate
strong keys from biometrics and other noisy data,’’ in Advances in Cryptology (Lecture Notes in Computer Science), vol. 3027. Berlin, Germany:
Springer, 2004, pp. 523–540.
4487

IEEEAccess·

M. Wazid et al.: Security in 5G-Enabled IoT Communication: Issues, Challenges, and Future Research Roadmap

[128] C.-T. Li, M.-S. Hwang, and Y.-P. Chu, ‘‘A secure and efficient communication scheme with authenticated key establishment and privacy
preserving for vehicular ad hoc networks,’’ Comput. Commun., vol. 31,
no. 12, pp. 2803–2814, Jul. 2008.
[129] W. Li, Q. Wen, Q. Su, and Z. Jin, ‘‘An efficient and secure mobile
payment protocol for restricted connectivity scenarios in vehicular ad hoc
network,’’ Comput. Commun., vol. 35, no. 2, pp. 188–195, Jan. 2012.
[130] D. He, N. Kumar, J.-H. Lee, and R. S. Sherratt, ‘‘Enhanced three-factor
security protocol for consumer USB mass storage devices,’’ IEEE Trans.
Consum. Electron., vol. 60, no. 1, pp. 30–37, Feb. 2014.
[131] R. L. Rivest, M. E. Hellman, J. C. Anderson, and J. W. Lyons, ‘‘Responses
to NIST’s proposal,’’ Commun. ACM, vol. 35, no. 7, pp. 41–54, Jul. 1992.
[132] Secure Hash Standard, Standard FIPS PUB 180-1, National
Institute of Standards and Technology, U.S. Department of
Commerce, Apr. 1995. Accessed: Jan. 2019. [Online]. Available:
http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.180-4.pdf
[133] Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), Standard FIPS PUB 197,
National Institute of Standards and Technology, U.S. Department of
Commerce, Nov. 2001. Accessed: Dec. 2019. [Online]. Available:
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips197/fips-197.pdf
[134] P. Porambage, C. Schmitt, P. Kumar, A. Gurtov, and M. Ylianttila,
‘‘Two-phase authentication protocol for wireless sensor networks in distributed IoT applications,’’ in Proc. IEEE Wireless Commun. Netw. Conf.
(WCNC), Istanbul, Turkey, Apr. 2014, pp. 2728–2733.
[135] P. Porambage, A. Braeken, C. Schmitt, A. Gurtov, M. Ylianttila, and
B. Stiller, ‘‘Group key establishment for enabling secure multicast communication in wireless sensor networks deployed for IoT applications,’’
IEEE Access, vol. 3, pp. 1503–1511, 2015.
[136] M. Turkanović, B. Brumen, and M. Hölbl, ‘‘A novel user authentication
and key agreement scheme for heterogeneous ad hoc wireless sensor
networks, based on the Internet of Things notion,’’ Ad Hoc Netw., vol. 20,
pp. 96–112, Sep. 2014.
[137] M. S. Farash, M. Turkanović, S. Kumari, and M. Hölbl, ‘‘An efficient
user authentication and key agreement scheme for heterogeneous wireless
sensor network tailored for the Internet of Things environment,’’ Ad Hoc
Netw., vol. 36, pp. 152–176, Jan. 2016.
[138] M. Wazid, A. K. Das, V. Bhat K, and A. V. Vasilakos, ‘‘LAM-CIoT:
Lightweight authentication mechanism in cloud-based IoT environment,’’
J. Netw. Comput. Appl., vol. 150, Jan. 2020, Art. no. 102496, doi:
10.1016/j.jnca.2019.102496.
[139] F. Li, Y. Han, and C. Jin, ‘‘Practical access control for sensor networks in
the context of the Internet of Things,’’ Comput. Commun., vols. 89–90,
pp. 154–164, Sep. 2016.
[140] A. Braeken, P. Porambage, M. Stojmenovic, and L. Lambrinos,
‘‘eDAAAS: Efficient distributed anonymous authentication and access in
smart homes,’’ Int. J. Distrib. Sensor Netw., vol. 12, no. 12, pp. 1–11,
Dec. 2016.
[141] M. Luo, Y. Luo, Y. Wan, and Z. Wang, ‘‘Secure and efficient access
control scheme for wireless sensor networks in the cross-domain context
of the IoT,’’ Secur. Commun. Netw., vol. 2018, pp. 1–10, Feb. 2018, doi:
10.1155/2018/6140978.
[142] S. Ding, J. Cao, C. Li, K. Fan, and H. Li, ‘‘A novel attribute-based
access control scheme using blockchain for IoT,’’ IEEE Access, vol. 7,
pp. 38431–38441, 2019.
[143] K. Riad, R. Hamza, and H. Yan, ‘‘Sensitive and energetic IoT access
control for managing cloud electronic health records,’’ IEEE Access,
vol. 7, pp. 86384–86393, 2019.
[144] K. Fan, H. Xu, L. Gao, H. Li, and Y. Yang, ‘‘Efficient and privacy
preserving access control scheme for fog-enabled IoT,’’ Future Gener.
Comput. Syst., vol. 99, pp. 134–142, Oct. 2019.
[145] A. K. Das, M. Wazid, A. R. Yannam, J. J. P. C. Rodrigues, and Y. Park,
‘‘Provably secure ECC-based device access control and key agreement
protocol for IoT environment,’’ IEEE Access, vol. 7, pp. 55382–55397,
2019.
[146] K. Selvakumar, M. Karuppiah, L. SaiRamesh, S. H. Islam, M. M. Hassan,
G. Fortino, and K.-K.-R. Choo, ‘‘Intelligent temporal classification and
fuzzy rough set-based feature selection algorithm for intrusion detection
system in WSNs,’’ Inf. Sci., vol. 497, pp. 77–90, Sep. 2019.
[147] S. U. Jan, S. Ahmed, V. Shakhov, and I. Koo, ‘‘Toward a lightweight
intrusion detection system for the Internet of Things,’’ IEEE Access,
vol. 7, pp. 42450–42471, 2019.
[148] V. Sharma, I. You, K. Yim, I.-R. Chen, and J.-H. Cho, ‘‘BRIoT: Behavior
rule specification-based misbehavior detection for IoT-embedded cyberphysical systems,’’ IEEE Access, vol. 7, pp. 118556–118580, 2019.
4488

[149] H. H. Pajouh, R. Javidan, R. Khayami, A. Dehghantanha, and
K.-K.-R. Choo, ‘‘A two-layer dimension reduction and two-tier classification model for anomaly-based intrusion detection in IoT backbone networks,’’ IEEE Trans. Emerg. Topics Comput., vol. 7, no. 2, pp. 314–323,
Apr. 2019.
[150] A. Mudgerikar, P. Sharma, and E. Bertino, ‘‘E-spion: A system-level
intrusion detection system for IoT devices,’’ in Proc. ACM Asia Conf.
Comput. Commun. Secur. (Asia CCS), Auckland, New Zealand, 2019,
pp. 493–500.
[151] A. Saeed, A. Ahmadinia, A. Javed, and H. Larikani, ‘‘Intelligent intrusion
detection in low-power IoTs,’’ ACM Trans. Internet Technol., vol. 16,
no. 4, pp. 27:1–27:25, 2016.
[152] R. Kumar, X. Zhang, W. Wang, R. U. Khan, J. Kumar, and A. Sharif,
‘‘A multimodal malware detection technique for Android IoT devices
using various features,’’ IEEE Access, vol. 7, pp. 64411–64430, 2019.
[153] B. Wu, K. Xu, Q. Li, Z. Liu, Y.-C. Hu, Z. Zhang, X. Du, B. Liu, and S. Ren,
‘‘SmartCrowd: Decentralized and automated incentives for distributed
IoT system detection,’’ in Proc. IEEE 39th Int. Conf. Distrib. Comput.
Syst. (ICDCS), Dallas, TX, USA, Jul. 2019, pp. 1106–1116.

MOHAMMAD WAZID (Senior Member, IEEE)
received the M.Tech. degree in computer network
engineering from Graphic Era deemed to be University, Dehradun, India, and the Ph.D. degree
in computer science and engineering from the
International Institute of Information Technology,
Hyderabad, India. He was working as an Assistant Professor with the Department of Computer
Science and Engineering, Manipal Institute of
Technology, MAHE, Manipal, India. He was a
Post-Doctoral Researcher with the Cyber Security and Networks Laboratory, Innopolis University, Innopolis, Russia. He is currently working
as an Associate Professor with the Department of Computer Science and
Engineering, Graphic Era deemed to be University. He is also the Head
of the Cyber Security and IoT Research Group, Graphic Era deemed to
be University. His current research interests include information security,
remote user authentication, the Internet of Things (IoT), cloud/fog/edge
computing, and blockchain. He has published more than 80 papers in international journals and conferences in the above areas. Some of his research
findings are published in top cited journals, such as the IEEE TRANSACTIONS
ON DEPENDABLE AND SECURE COMPUTING, IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SMART
GRID, IEEE INTERNET OF THINGS JOURNAL, IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INDUSTRIAL
INFORMATICS, IEEE JOURNAL OF BIOMEDICAL AND HEALTH INFORMATICS (formerly IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY IN BIOMEDICINE), IEEE
Consumer Electronics Magazine, IEEE ACCESS, Future Generation Computer Systems (Elsevier), Computers & Electrical Engineering (Elsevier),
Computer Methods and Programs in Biomedicine (Elsevier), Security and
Communication Networks (Wiley), and Journal of Network and Computer
Applications (Elsevier). He has served as a Program Committee Member
in many international conferences. He was a recipient of the University
Gold Medal and the Young Scientist Award by UCOST, Department of
Science and Technology, Government of Uttarakhand, India. He received the
Dr. A. P. J. Abdul Kalam Award for his innovative research works and the
ICT Express (Elsevier) Journal ‘‘Best Reviewer’’ Award, in 2019.
VOLUME 9, 2021

M. Wazid et al.: Security in 5G-Enabled IoT Communication: Issues, Challenges, and Future Research Roadmap

Ashok Kumar Das (Senior Member, IEEE)
received the M.Tech. degree in computer science
and data processing, the M.Sc. degree in mathematics, and the Ph.D. degree in computer science
and engineering from IIT Kharagpur, India. He is
currently an Associate Professor with the Center
for Security, Theory and Algorithmic Research,
International Institute of Information Technology,
Hyderabad, India. His research interests include
cryptography, network security, blockchain, security in Internet of Things (IoT), Internet of Vehicles (IoV), Internet of
Drones (IoD), smart grids, smart city, cloud/fog computing and industrial wireless sensor networks, intrusion detection, blockchain, and AI/ML
security. He has authored over 245 papers in international journals and
conferences in the above areas, including over 210 reputed journal papers.
Some of his research findings are published in top cited journals, such
as the IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFORMATION FORENSICS AND SECURITY, IEEE
TRANSACTIONS ON DEPENDABLE AND SECURE COMPUTING, IEEE TRANSACTIONS
ON SMART GRID, IEEE INTERNET OF THINGS JOURNAL, IEEE TRANSACTIONS
ON INDUSTRIAL INFORMATICS, IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON VEHICULAR TECHNOLOGY,
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON CONSUMER ELECTRONICS, IEEE JOURNAL OF BIOMEDICAL
AND HEALTH INFORMATICS (formerly IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFORMATION
TECHNOLOGY IN BIOMEDICINE), IEEE Consumer Electronics Magazine, IEEE
ACCESS, IEEE Communications Magazine, Future Generation Computer
Systems, Computers & Electrical Engineering, Computer Methods and
Programs in Biomedicine, Computer Standards & Interfaces, Computer
Networks, Expert Systems with Applications, and Journal of Network and
Computer Applications. He was a recipient of the Institute Silver Medal from
IIT Kharagpur. He serves on the Editorial Board of IEEE SYSTEMS JOURNAL,
Journal of Network and Computer Applications (Elsevier), Computer Communications (Elsevier), IET Communications, KSII Transactions on Internet
and Information Systems, and International Journal of Internet Technology
and Secured Transactions (Inderscience). He is a Guest Editor of Computers
& Electrical Engineering (Elsevier) for the Special Issue on Big Data and IoT
in e-Healthcare, ICT Express (Elsevier) for the Special Issue on Blockchain
Technologies and Applications for 5G Enabled IoT, and Wireless Communications and Mobile Computing for the Special Issue on Security and Privacy
for Smart Mobile Devices: Attacks, Challenges, and New Designs. He has
served as a Program Committee Member in many international conferences.
He served as one of the Technical Program Committee Chairs of the first
International Congress on Blockchain and Applications (BLOCKCHAIN
2019), Ávila, Spain, in June 2019, the International Conference on Applied
Soft Computing and Communication Networks (ACN 2020), Chennai, India,
in October 2020, and the second International Congress on Blockchain and
Applications (BLOCKCHAIN 2020), L’Aquila, Italy, in October 2020.
SACHIN SHETTY (Senior Member, IEEE)
received the Ph.D. degree in modeling and simulation from Old Dominion University, in 2007.
He was an Associate Professor with the Electrical and Computer Engineering Department,
Tennessee State University, USA. He is currently
an Associate Professor with the Virginia Modeling, Analysis and Simulation Center, Old Dominion University. He holds a joint appointment with
the Department of Modeling, Simulation and Visualization Engineering and the Center for Cybersecurity Education and
Research. He has authored or coauthored over 125 research articles in
journals and conference proceedings and two books. His research interests
include the intersection of computer networking, network security, and
machine learning. He was a recipient of the DHS Scientific Leadership
Award. He has served on the Technical Program Committee of ACM CCS,
IEEE INFOCOM, IEEE ICDCN, and IEEE ICCCN.

VOLUME 9, 2021

IEEEAccess·

PROSANTA GOPE (Member, IEEE) received the
Ph.D. degree in computer science and information
engineering from National Cheng Kung University (NCKU), Tainan, Taiwan, in 2015. He was
a Research Fellow with the Department of Computer Science, National University of Singapore
(NUS). He is currently working as a Lecturer with
the Department of Computer Science, University
of Sheffield, Sheffield, U.K. His research interests
include lightweight authentication, authenticated
encryption, access control systems, security in mobile communication and
cloud computing, lightweight security solutions for smart grid, and hardware
security of the Internet of Things (IoT) devices. He has authored over 50 peerreviewed articles in several reputable international journals and conferences
and has four filed patents. He received the Distinguished Ph.D. Scholar
Award from National Cheng Kung University, Tainan, Taiwan, in 2014.
He also serves as an Associate Editor for the IEEE SENSORS JOURNAL and
Security and Communication Networks.

JOEL J. P. C. RODRIGUES (Fellow, IEEE) is
currently a Professor with the Federal University
of Piauí, Brazil and a Senior Researcher with the
Instituto de Telecomunicações, Portugal. He is a
collaborator of the Post-Graduation Program on
Teleinformatics Engineering at the Federal University of Ceará (UFC), Brazil. He is also the
Leader of the Next Generation Networks and
Applications (NetGNA) research group (CNPq).
He has authored or coauthored over 950 papers in
refereed international journals and conferences, three books, two patents, and
one ITU-T Recommendation. He is a member of the Internet Society and
a Senior Member of ACM. He received several outstanding leadership
and outstanding service awards from the IEEE Communications Society
and several best papers awards. He is an IEEE Distinguished Lecturer,
a Member Representative of the IEEE Communications Society on the IEEE
Biometrics Council, and the President of the scientific council at ParkUrbis–
Covilhã Science and Technology Park. He was Director of the Conference
Development—IEEE ComSoc Board of Governors, the Technical Activities
Committee Chair of the IEEE ComSoc Latin America Region Board, the past
Chair of the IEEE ComSoc Technical Committee on eHealth and the IEEE
ComSoc Technical Committee on Communications Software, a Steering
Committee Member of the IEEE Life Sciences Technical Community, and
the Publications Co-Chair. He is also the Editor-in-Chief of the International
Journal of E-Health and Medical Communications and an Editorial Board
Member of several high-reputed journals. He has been the General Chair
and the TPC Chair of many international conferences, including IEEE ICC,
IEEE GLOBECOM, IEEE HEALTHCOM, and IEEE LatinCom.

•••

4489

